CHAPTER 67 - FREEDOM FOR RUSSIA AND EMERGING EURASIAN DEMOCRACIES AND OPEN MARKETS SUPPORT

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§ 5801 Definition of independent states

For purposes of this Act, the terms “independent states of the former Soviet Union” and “independent states” mean the following: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. ( Pub. L. 102–511, § 3 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3321 .)

“SEC. 101 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.

“The purpose of this Act [see Short Title of 1993 Amendment note above] is to amend or repeal numerous statutory provisions that restrict or otherwise impede normal relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union. All of the statutory provisions amended or repealed by this Act were relevant and appropriate at the time of enactment, but with the end of the Cold War, they have become obsolete. It is not the purpose of this Act to rewrite or erase history, or to forget those who suffered in the past from the injustices or repression of communist regimes in the Soviet Union, but rather to update United States law to reflect changed international circumstances and to demonstrate for reformers and democrats in the independent states of the former Soviet Union the resolve of the people of the United States to support the process of democratic and economic reform and to conduct business with those states in a new spirit of friendship and cooperation.

“SEC. 102 FINDINGS.

“The Congress finds and declares as follows: The Vancouver Declaration issued by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in April 1993 marked a new milestone in the development of the spirit of cooperation and partnership between the United States and Russia. The Congress affirms its support for the principles contained in the Vancouver Declaration. The Vancouver Declaration underscored that— a dynamic and effective partnership between the United States and Russia is vital to the success of Russia’s historic transformation; the rapid integration of Russia into the community of democratic nations and the world economy is important to the national interest of the United States; and cooperation between the United States and Russia is essential to the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and the promotion of democratic values, the protection of human rights, and the solution of global problems such as environmental pollution, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. The Congress enacted the FREEDOM Support Act ( Public Law 102–511 ) [see Short Title note above], as well as other legislation such as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (title II of Public Law 102–228 ) [ 22 U.S.C. 2551 note] and the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (title XIV of Public Law 102–484 ) [ 22 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.], to help meet the historic opportunities and challenges presented by the transformation that has taken place, and is continuing to take place, in what once was the Soviet Union. The process of reform in Russia, Ukraine, and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union is ongoing. The holding of a referendum in Russia on April 25, 1993 , that was free and fair, and that reflected the support of the Russian people for the process of continued and strengthened democratic and economic reform, represents an important and encouraging hallmark in this ongoing process. There remain in force many United States laws that are relics of the Cold War, and repeals or revisions of these provisions can play an important role in efforts to foster and strengthen the bonds of trust and friendship, as well as mutually beneficial trade and economic relations, between the United States and Russia, the United States and Ukraine, and the United States and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union.

“SEC. 103 STATUTORY PROVISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN APPLICABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

(“(a) In General.— There are numerous statutory provisions that were enacted in the context of United States relations with a country, the Soviet Union, that are fundamentally different from the relations that now exist between the United States and Russia, between the United States and Ukraine, and between the United States and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union.

(“(b) Extent of Such Provisions.— Many of the provisions referred to in subsection (a) imposed limitations specifically with respect to the Soviet Union, and its constituent republics, or utilized language that reflected the tension that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of their enactment. Other such provisions did not refer specifically to the Soviet Union, but nonetheless were directed (or may be construed as having been directed) against the Soviet Union on the basis of the relations that formerly existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly in its role as the leading communist country.

(“(c) Findings and Affirmation.— The Congress finds and affirms that provisions such as those described in this section, including— section 216 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 ( 22 U.S.C. 4316 ), sections 136 [ 22 U.S.C. 3943 note] and 804 [ 99 Stat. 449 ] of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 ( Public Law 99–93 ), section 1222 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 ( Public Law 100–204 ; 101 Stat. 1411 [1414]), the Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act (50 [App.] U.S.C. 2410 note, et seq.) [probably means former 50 U.S.C. App. 2410a note, see Short Title of 1988 Amendment note now set out under former section 4601 of Title 50 , War and National Defense], the joint resolution providing for the designation of ‘Captive Nations Week’ ( Public Law 86–90 ) [ 73 Stat. 212 ], the Communist Control Act of 1954 ( Public Law 83–637 ) [see Short Title note set out under section 781 of Title 50 ], provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), including sections 101(a)(40), 101(e)(3), and 313(a)(3) [ 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(40) , (e)(3), 1424(a)(3)], section 2 of the joint resolution entitled ‘A joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East’, approved March 9, 1957 ( Public Law 85–7 ) [ 22 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.], and section 43 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act ( 22 U.S.C. 286aa ), should not be construed as being directed against Russia, Ukraine, or the other independent states of the former Soviet Union, connoting an adversarial relationship between the United States and the independent states, or signifying or implying in any manner unfriendliness toward the independent states.”

§ 5811 Findings

The Congress finds that— recent developments in Russia and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union present an historic opportunity for a transition to a peaceful and stable international order and the integration of the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of democratic nations; the entire international community has a vital interest in the success of this transition, and the dimension of the problems now faced in the independent states of the former Soviet Union makes it imperative for donor countries and institutions to provide the expertise and support necessary to ensure continued progress on economic and political reforms; the United States is especially well-positioned because of its heritage and traditions to make a substantial contribution to this transition by building on current technical cooperation, medical, and food assistance programs, by assisting in the development of democratic institutions, and by fostering conditions that will encourage the United States business community to engage in trade and investment; failure to meet the opportunities presented by these developments could threaten United States national security interests and jeopardize substantial savings in United States defense that these developments have made possible; the independent states of the former Soviet Union face unprecedented environmental problems that jeopardize the quality of life and the very existence of not only their own peoples but also the peoples of other countries, and it is incumbent on the international community to assist the independent states in addressing these problems and in promoting sustainable use of resources and development; the success of United States assistance for the independent states of the former Soviet Union depends on— effective coordination of United States efforts with similar activities of friendly and allied donor countries and of international financial institutions, and reciprocal commitments by the governments of the independent states to work toward the creation of democratic institutions and an environment hospitable to foreign investment based upon the rule of law, including negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements on open trade and investment, adoption of commercial codes, establishment of transparency in regulatory and other governmental decision making, and timely payment of obligations carried over from previous governmental entities; and trade and investment opportunities in the independent states of the former Soviet Union will generate employment and other economic benefits for the United States as the economies of the independent states of the former Soviet Union begin to realize their enormous potential as both customers and suppliers. ( Pub. L. 102–511, title I, § 101 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3321 .)

“SEC. 401 SHORT TITLE.

“This title may be cited as the ‘Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012’.

“SEC. 402 FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(“(a) Findings.— Congress finds the following: The United States aspires to a mutually beneficial relationship with the Russian Federation based on respect for human rights and the rule of law, and supports the people of the Russian Federation in their efforts to realize their full economic potential and to advance democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Russian Federation— is a member of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the International Monetary Fund; has ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption; and is bound by the legal obligations set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights. States voluntarily commit themselves to respect obligations and responsibilities through the adoption of international agreements and treaties, which must be observed in good faith in order to maintain the stability of the international order. Human rights are an integral part of international law, and lie at the foundation of the international order. The protection of human rights, therefore, particularly in the case of a country that has incurred obligations to protect human rights under an international agreement to which it is a party, is not left exclusively to the internal affairs of that country. Good governance and anti-corruption measures are instrumental in the protection of human rights and in achieving sustainable economic growth, which benefits both the people of the Russian Federation and the international community through the creation of open and transparent markets. Systemic corruption erodes trust and confidence in democratic institutions, the rule of law, and human rights protections. This is the case when public officials are allowed to abuse their authority with impunity for political or financial gains in collusion with private entities. The Russian nongovernmental organization INDEM has estimated that bribes by individuals and businesses in the Russian Federation amount to hundreds of billions of dollars a year, an increasing share of the country’s gross domestic product. Sergei Leonidovich Magnitsky died on November 16, 2009 , at the age of 37, in Matrosskaya Tishina Prison in Moscow, Russia, and is survived by a mother, a wife, and 2 sons. On July 6, 2011 , Russian President Dimitry Medvedev’s Human Rights Council announced the results of its independent investigation into the death of Sergei Magnitsky. The Human Rights Council concluded that Sergei Magnitsky’s arrest and detention was illegal; he was denied access to justice by the courts and prosecutors of the Russian Federation; he was investigated by the same law enforcement officers whom he had accused of stealing Hermitage Fund companies and illegally obtaining a fraudulent $230,000,000 tax refund; he was denied necessary medical care in custody; he was beaten by 8 guards with rubber batons on the last day of his life; and the ambulance crew that was called to treat him as he was dying was deliberately kept outside of his cell for one hour and 18 minutes until he was dead. The report of the Human Rights Council also states the officials falsified their accounts of what happened to Sergei Magnitsky and, 18 months after his death, no officials had been brought to trial for his false arrest or the crime he uncovered. The impunity continued in April 2012, when Russian authorities dropped criminal charges against Larisa Litvinova, the head doctor at the prison where Magnitsky died. The systematic abuse of Sergei Magnitsky, including his repressive arrest and torture in custody by officers of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation that Mr. Magnitsky had implicated in the embezzlement of funds from the Russian Treasury and the misappropriation of 3 companies from his client, Hermitage Capital Management, reflects how deeply the protection of human rights is affected by corruption. The politically motivated nature of the persecution of Mr. Magnitsky is demonstrated by— the denial by all state bodies of the Russian Federation of any justice or legal remedies to Mr. Magnitsky during the nearly 12 full months he was kept without trial in detention; and the impunity since his death of state officials he testified against for their involvement in corruption and the carrying out of his repressive persecution. The Public Oversight Commission of the City of Moscow for the Control of the Observance of Human Rights in Places of Forced Detention, an organization empowered by Russian law to independently monitor prison conditions, concluded on December 29, 2009 , ‘A man who is kept in custody and is being detained is not capable of using all the necessary means to protect either his life or his health. This is a responsibility of a state which holds him captive. Therefore, the case of Sergei Magnitsky can be described as a breach of the right to life. The members of the civic supervisory commission have reached the conclusion that Magnitsky had been experiencing both psychological and physical pressure in custody, and the conditions in some of the wards of Butyrka can be justifiably called torturous. The people responsible for this must be punished.’. Sergei Magnitsky’s experience, while particularly illustrative of the negative effects of official corruption on the rights of an individual citizen, appears to be emblematic of a broader pattern of disregard for the numerous domestic and international human rights commitments of the Russian Federation and impunity for those who violate basic human rights and freedoms. The second trial, verdict, and sentence against former Yukos executives Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev evoke serious concerns about the right to a fair trial and the independence of the judiciary in the Russian Federation. The lack of credible charges, intimidation of witnesses, violations of due process and procedural norms, falsification or withholding of documents, denial of attorney-client privilege, and illegal detention in the Yukos case are highly troubling. The Council of Europe, Freedom House, and Amnesty International, among others, have concluded that they were charged and imprisoned in a process that did not follow the rule of law and was politically influenced. Furthermore, senior officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, including First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, have acknowledged that the arrest and imprisonment of Khodorkovsky were politically motivated. According to Freedom House’s 2011 report entitled ‘The Perpetual Battle: Corruption in the Former Soviet Union and the New EU Members’, ‘[t]he highly publicized cases of Sergei Magnitsky, a 37-year-old lawyer who died in pretrial detention in November 2009 after exposing a multimillion-dollar fraud against the Russian taxpayer, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the jailed business magnate and regime critic who was sentenced at the end of 2010 to remain in prison through 2017, put an international spotlight on the Russian state’s contempt for the rule of law * * *. By silencing influential and accomplished figures such as Khodorkovsky and Magnitsky, the Russian authorities have made it abundantly clear that anyone in Russia can be silenced.’. The tragic and unresolved murders of Nustap Abdurakhmanov, Maksharip Aushev, Natalya Estemirova, Akhmed Hadjimagomedov, Umar Israilov, Paul Klebnikov, Anna Politkovskaya, Saihadji Saihadjiev, and Magomed Y. Yevloyev, the death in custody of Vera Trifonova, the disappearances of Mokhmadsalakh Masaev and Said-Saleh Ibragimov, the torture of Ali Israilov and Islam Umarpashaev, the near-fatal beatings of Mikhail Beketov, Oleg Kashin, Arkadiy Lander, and Mikhail Vinyukov, and the harsh and ongoing imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Alexei Kozlov, Platon Lebedev, and Fyodor Mikheev further illustrate the grave danger of exposing the wrongdoing of officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, including Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, or of seeking to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.

(“(b) Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that the United States should continue to strongly support, and provide assistance to, the efforts of the Russian people to establish a vibrant democratic political system that respects individual liberties and human rights, including by enhancing the provision of objective information through all relevant media, such as Radio Liberty and the internet. The Russian Government’s suppression of dissent and political opposition, the limitations it has imposed on civil society and independent media, and the deterioration of economic and political freedom inside Russia are of profound concern to the United States Government and to the American people.

“SEC. 403 DEFINITIONS.

“In this title: The terms ‘admitted’ and ‘alien’ have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101 ). The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means— the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. The term ‘financial institution’ has the meaning given that term in section 5312 of title 31 , United States Code. The term ‘United States person’ means— a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

“SEC. 404 IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DETENTION, ABUSE, AND DEATH OF SERGEI MAGNITSKY AND OTHER GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

(“(a) In General.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [ Dec. 14, 2012 ], the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of each person who the President determines, based on credible information— is responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, participated in efforts to conceal the legal liability for the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, financially benefitted from the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, or was involved in the criminal conspiracy uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky; is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed against individuals seeking— to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the rights to a fair trial and democratic elections, in Russia; or acted as an agent of or on behalf of a person in a matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1) or (2).

(“(b) Updates.— The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update of the list required by subsection (a) as new information becomes available.

(“(c) Form.— The list required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form. The name of a person to be included in the list required by subsection (a) may be submitted in a classified annex only if the President— determines that it is vital for the national security interests of the United States to do so; uses the annex in such a manner consistent with congressional intent and the purposes of this Act; and 15 days prior to submitting the name in a classified annex, provides to the appropriate congressional committees notice of, and a justification for, including or continuing to include each person in the classified annex despite any publicly available credible information indicating that the person engaged in an activity described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a). In preparing the list required by subsection (a), the President shall consider information provided by the chairperson and ranking member of each of the appropriate congressional committees and credible data obtained by other countries and nongovernmental organizations, including organizations inside Russia, that monitor the human rights abuses of the Government of the Russian Federation. The unclassified portion of the list required by subsection (a) shall be made available to the public and published in the Federal Register.

(“(d) Removal From List.— A person may be removed from the list required by subsection (a) if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days prior to the removal of the person from the list that— credible information exists that the person did not engage in the activity for which the person was added to the list; the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity in which the person engaged; or the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activities in which the person engaged, and has credibly committed to not engage in the types of activities specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a).

(“(e) Requests by Chairperson and Ranking Member of Appropriate Congressional Committees.— Not later than 120 days after receiving a written request from the chairperson and ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees with respect to whether a person meets the criteria for being added to the list required by subsection (a), the President shall submit a response to the chairperson and ranking member of the committee which made the request with respect to the status of the person. The President may submit a response required by paragraph (1) in classified form if the President determines that it is necessary for the national security interests of the United States to do so. If the President removes from the list required by subsection (a) a person who has been placed on the list at the request of the chairperson and ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, the President shall provide the chairperson and ranking member with any information that contributed to the removal decision. The President may submit such information in classified form if the President determines that such is necessary for the national security interests of the United States.

(“(f) Nonapplicability of Confidentiality Requirement With Respect to Visa Records.— The President shall publish the list required by subsection (a) without regard to the requirements of section 222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1202(f) ) with respect to confidentiality of records pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States.

“SEC. 405 INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS.

(“(a) Ineligibility for Visas.— An alien is ineligible to receive a visa to enter the United States and ineligible to be admitted to the United States if the alien is on the list required by section 404(a).

(“(b) Current Visas Revoked.— The Secretary of State shall revoke, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1201(i) ), the visa or other documentation of any alien who would be ineligible to receive such a visa or documentation under subsection (a) of this section.

(“(c) Waiver for National Security Interests.— The Secretary of State may waive the application of subsection (a) or (b) in the case of an alien if— the Secretary determines that such a waiver— is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947 , and entered into force November 21, 1947 , or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or is in the national security interests of the United States; and prior to granting such a waiver, the Secretary provides to the appropriate congressional committees notice of, and a justification for, the waiver. Notification under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) shall be made not later than 15 days prior to granting a waiver under such paragraph if the Secretary grants such waiver in the national security interests of the United States in accordance with subparagraph (A)(ii) of such paragraph.

(“(d) Regulatory Authority.— The Secretary of State shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out this section.

“SEC. 406 FINANCIAL MEASURES.

(“(a) Freezing of Assets.— The President shall exercise all powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 ) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to freeze and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person who is on the list required by section 404(a) of this Act if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to persons included on the classified annex under section 404(c)(2) if the President determines that such an exception is vital for the national security interests of the United States.

(“(b) Waiver for National Security Interests.— The Secretary of the Treasury may waive the application of subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States. Not less than 15 days prior to granting such a waiver, the Secretary shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees notice of, and a justification for, the waiver.

(“(c) Enforcement.— A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1705 ) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [ Dec. 14, 2012 ], the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe or amend regulations as needed to require each financial institution that is a United States person and has within its possession or control assets that are property or interests in property of a person who is on the list required by section 404(a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States to certify to the Secretary that, to the best of the knowledge of the financial institution, the financial institution has frozen all assets within the possession or control of the financial institution that are required to be frozen pursuant to subsection (a).

(“(d) Regulatory Authority.— The Secretary of the Treasury shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry out this section.

“SEC. 407 REPORT TO CONGRESS.

“Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act [ Dec. 14, 2012 ] and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on— the actions taken to carry out this title, including— the number of persons added to or removed from the list required by section 404(a) during the year preceding the report, the dates on which such persons have been added or removed, and the reasons for adding or removing them; and if few or no such persons have been added to that list during that year, the reasons for not adding more such persons to the list; and efforts by the executive branch to encourage the governments of other countries to impose sanctions that are similar to the sanctions imposed under this title.”

“SECTION 1 SHORT TITLE.

“This Act may be cited as the ‘Belarus Democracy Act of 2004’.

“SEC. 2 FINDINGS.

“Congress finds the following: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York December 19, 1966 , was ratified by Belarus in 1973, guaranteeing Belarusians the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. Alyaksandr Lukashenka has ruled Belarus as an undemocratic dictatorship since the first presidential election in Belarus in 1994. Subsequent presidential elections in Belarus have been neither free nor fair and have been rejected by the international community as not meeting minimal electoral standards, with the jailing of opposition activists frequently used as a tool of government repression before and after the elections. In response to the repression and violence during the 2006 presidential election, Congress passed the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006 ( Public Law 109–480 ). In 2006, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13405, titled ‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus’ [listed in a table under section 1701 of Title 50 , War and National Defense], which authorized the imposition of sanctions against persons responsible for— undermining democratic processes in Belarus; or participating in human rights abuses related to political repression in Belarus. In March 2011, the Senate unanimously passed Senate Resolution 105, which— condemned the December 2010 election in Belarus as ‘illegitimate, fraudulent, and not representative of the will or the aspirations of the voters in Belarus’; and called on the Lukashenka regime ‘to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners in Belarus who were arrested in association with the December 19, 2010 , election’. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a pattern of clear and persistent violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a pattern of clear and uncorrected violations of basic principles of democratic governance, including through a series of fundamentally flawed presidential and parliamentary elections undermining the legitimacy of executive and legislative authority in that country. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thousands of pro-democracy political activists and peaceful protesters to harassment, beatings, and imprisonment, particularly as a result of their attempts to peacefully exercise their right to freedom of assembly and association. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to suppress independent media and journalists and to restrict access to the internet, including social media and other digital communication platforms, in violation of the right to freedom of speech and expression of those dissenting from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of nongovernmental organizations, including independent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil society and social solidarity. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy undermining the country’s sovereignty and independence by making Belarus political, economic, cultural, and societal interests subservient to those of Russia. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to reduce the independence of Belarus through integration into a so-called ‘Union State’ that is under the control of Russia. In advance of the August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus, authorities acting on behalf of President Lukashenka arrested journalists, bloggers, political activists, and opposition leaders, including 3 leading presidential candidates (Syarhey Tsikhanouski, Mikalay Statkevich, and Viktar Babaryka), who were barred from running in the election by the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Belarus. While the 3 opposition candidates were imprisoned, 2 of their wives and 1 of their campaign managers (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Veranika Tsepkala, and Maria Kalesnikava) joined together and ran in place of the candidates. Thousands of Belarusian people demonstrated their support for these candidates by attending rallies, including 1 rally that included an estimated 63,000 participants. On August, 5, 2020, the Senate unanimously passed Senate Resolution 658, which calls for a free, fair, and transparent presidential election in Belarus, including the unimpeded participation of all presidential candidates. On August 9, 2020 , the Government of Belarus conducted a presidential election that— was held under undemocratic conditions that did not meet international standards; involved government malfeasance and serious irregularities with ballot counting and the reporting of election results, including— early voting ballot stuffing; ballot burning; pressuring poll workers; and removing bags full of ballots by climbing out of windows; included restrictive measures that impeded the work of local independent observers and did not provide sufficient notice to the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elections, as is customary. Incumbent president Alyaksandr Lukashenka declared a landslide victory in the election and claimed to have received more than 80 percent of the votes cast in the election. The leading opposition candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya— formally disputed the government’s reported election results; explained that her staff had examined the election results from more than 50 polling places; and found that her share of the vote exceeded Lukashenka’s share by many times. On August 10, 2020 , Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was detained while attending a meeting with the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Belarus and forced to flee to Lithuania under pressure from government authorities. On August 11, 2020 , Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius announced that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was safe in Lithuania and has continued to be one of the strongest voices supporting the pro-democracy movement in Belarus within the European Union and globally. On August 18, 2020 , Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya announced the formation of a Coordination Council to oversee a resolution to the crisis in Belarus and a peaceful transition of power by subjecting the Council’s senior members to violence, detention, and forced exile. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has sought to stop the work of the Coordination Council. Before the European Parliament on August 25, 2020 , Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stressed that a ‘peaceful revolution’ was underway in Belarus, and that ‘It is neither a pro-Russian nor anti-Russian revolution. It is neither an anti-European Union nor a pro-European Union revolution. It is a democratic revolution.’. On or around September 6, 2020 , opposition leader Maria Kalesnikava and members of the Coordination Council, including Anton Ronenkov, Ivan Kravtsov, and Maxim Bogretsov, were detained by authorities who sought to forcibly expel them to Ukraine. Ms. Kalesnikava tore up her passport at the Ukrainian border in a successful effort to prevent this expulsion, subsequently disappeared, and was discovered in a Minsk prison on September 9, 2020 . On August 11, 2020 , the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, issued a declaration on the presidential election in Belarus stating that the elections were neither free nor fair. On August 28, 2020 , United States Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun declared that the August 9th election in Belarus was fraudulent. Following Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s September 23, 2020 , secret inauguration, the United States, the European Union, numerous European Union member states, the United Kingdom, and Canada announced that they did not recognize Mr. Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of Belarus. Since the sham election on August 9, 2020 , tens of thousands of Belarusian citizens have participated in daily peaceful protests calling for a new, free, and fair election, and the release of political prisoners. According to Amnesty International, on August 30, 2020 , Belarusians held one of the largest protest rallies in the country’s modern history in Minsk and in other cities, which was attended by at least 100,000 people who demanded the resignation of President Lukashenka and an investigation into the human rights violations in Belarus. Women have served as the leading force in demonstrations across the country, protesting the police brutality and mass detentions by wearing white, carrying flowers, forming ‘solidarity chains’, and unmasking undercover police trying to arrest demonstrators. The Government of Belarus has responded to the peaceful opposition protests, which are the largest in Belarus history, with a violent crackdown, including, according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur, the detention by government authorities of more than 10,000 peaceful protestors as of September 18, 2020 , mostly for taking part in or observing peaceful protests, with many of these arrests followed by beatings and torture at the hands of Belarusian law enforcement. According to the Viasna Human Rights Centre, at least 450 detainees have reported being tortured or otherwise ill-treated while held in incommunicado detention for up to 10 days, including through— severe beatings; forced performance of humiliating acts; and sexual violence and other forms of violence. At least 4 Belarusians have been killed at protests, and dozens of Belarusians who were detained during the protests are still missing. The Belarus Ministry of Defense threatened to send the army to confront protestors, warning that in case of any violation of peace and order in areas around national monuments, ‘you will have the army to deal with now, not the police’. The Government of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has consistently restricted the free flow of information to silence the opposition and to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful protestors, including by— stripping the accreditation of journalists from major foreign news outlets; detaining and harassing countless journalists. arresting dozens of journalists, 6 of whom report for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; halting the publishing of 2 independent newspapers; and disrupting internet access; blocking more than 50 news websites that were covering the protests; and limiting access to social media and other digital communication platforms. Internet access in Belarus has been repeatedly disrupted and restricted since August 9, 2020 , which independent experts and monitoring groups have attributed to government interference. Thousands of employees at Belarusian state-owned enterprises, who have been seen as Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s traditional base during his 26-year rule, went on strike across the country to protest Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and the subsequent crackdowns, including at some of Belarus’s largest factories such as the BelAZ truck plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the Minsk Automobile Plant. After the employees of state media outlets walked off the job in protest rather than help report misleading government propaganda, Lukashenka confirmed that he ‘asked the Russians’ to send teams of Russian journalists to replace local employees. On August 19, 2020 , European Council President Charles Michel announced that the European Union would impose sanctions on a substantial number of individuals responsible for violence, repression, and election fraud in Belarus. On October 2, 2020 , the Department of Treasury announced new sanctions under Executive Order 13405 on eight individuals ‘for their roles in the fraudulent August 9, 2020 Belarus presidential election or the subsequent violent crackdown on peaceful protesters’. Similar sanctions have also been applied to Belarusian human rights violators by the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom. Against the will of the majority of the Belarusian people— Alyaksandr Lukashenka appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to provide security assistance to his government, if requested; and President Putin has agreed to prop up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime by— confirming that a Russian police force was ready to be deployed if ‘the situation gets out of control’; providing significant financial support; and sending Russian propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime propaganda on Belarus state television. The Governments of the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada have— condemned the violent crackdown on peaceful protestors; refused to accept the results of the fraudulent election; and called for new free and fair elections under independent observation.

“SEC. 3 STATEMENT OF POLICY.

“It is the policy of the United States— to condemn— the conduct of the August 9, 2020 , presidential election in Belarus, which was neither free nor fair; the Belarusian authorities’ unrelenting crackdown on, arbitrary arrests of, and violence against opposition candidates, peaceful protestors, human rights activists, employees from state-owned enterprises participating in strikes, independent election observers, and independent journalists and bloggers; and the unjustified detention and forced or attempted expulsion of members of the Coordination Council in Belarus; to continue demanding the immediate release without preconditions of all political prisoners in Belarus and those arrested for peacefully protesting, including all those individuals detained in connection with the August 9, 2020 , presidential election; to stand in solidarity with the people of Belarus, including human rights defenders, bloggers, and journalists, who are exercising their right to freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, and rule of law and to continue supporting the aspirations of the people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; to continue actively supporting the aspirations of the people of the Republic of Belarus— to preserve the independence and sovereignty of their country; and to freely exercise their religion, including the head of the Catholic Church in Belarus, Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, who was barred from entering the country after criticizing Belarusian authorities; to recognize the leading role of women in the peaceful protests and pro-democracy movement in Belarus; to continue— rejecting the invalid results of the fraudulent August 9, 2020 presidential election in Belarus announced by the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Belarus; and supporting calls for new presidential and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner that is free and fair according to OSCE standards and under the supervision of OSCE observers and independent domestic observers; to refuse to recognize Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of Belarus; to not recognize any incorporation of Belarus into a ‘Union State’ with Russia, since this so-called ‘Union State’ would be both an attempt to absorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totalitarian Soviet Union; to continue calling for the fulfillment by the Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely undertaken obligations as an OSCE participating state and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Nations; to support an OSCE role in mediating a dialogue within Belarus between the government and genuine representatives of Belarusian society; to recognize the Coordination Council as a legitimate institution to participate in a dialogue on a peaceful transition of power; to applaud the commitment by foreign diplomats in Minsk to engage with Coordination Council member and Nobel Laureate, Svetlana Alexievich, and to encourage an ongoing dialogue with her and with other leaders of the democratically-oriented political opposition in Belarus; to urge an expanded United States diplomatic presence in Belarus to advocate for the aspirations of the people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; to encourage the United States Government— to continue working closely with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries and international organizations to promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Belarus; and to impose targeted sanctions, in coordination with the European Union and other international partners, against officials in Belarus who are responsible for— undermining democratic processes in Belarus; or participating in human rights abuses related to political repression in Belarus; to call on the Government of Belarus to uphold its human rights obligations, including those rights enumerated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and to support— the continued territorial integrity of Belarus; and the right of the Belarusian people to determine their future.

“SEC. 4 ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.

(“(a) Purposes of Assistance.— The assistance under this section shall be available for the following purposes: To assist the people of the Republic of Belarus in their pursuit of freedom, democracy, and human rights and in their aspiration to join the Trans-Atlantic community of democracies. To assist the people of Belarus in building the sovereignty and independence of their country. To encourage free, fair, and transparent presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Belarus, conducted in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards and under the supervision of internationally recognized observers and independent domestic observers. To assist in the development of a democratic political culture and civil society in Belarus.

(“(b) Authorization for Assistance.— To carry out the purposes of subsection (a), the President is authorized to furnish assistance and other support for the activities described in subsection (c), to be provided primarily for indigenous Belarusian groups and Belarusian groups outside of Belarus that are committed to the support of democratic processes and Belarusian sovereignty.

(“(c) Activities Supported.— Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (b) include— expanding independent radio and television broadcasting to and within Belarus; facilitating the development of independent broadcast, print, and Internet media working within Belarus and from locations outside the country and supported by nonstate-controlled printing facilities; countering internet censorship and repressive surveillance technology that seek to limit free association, control access to information, and prevent citizens from exercising their rights to free speech; aiding the development of civil society through assistance to nongovernmental organizations promoting democracy and supporting human rights, including youth groups, entrepreneurs, and independent trade unions; supporting the work of human rights defenders; enhancing the development of democratic political parties; assisting the promotion of free, fair, and transparent electoral processes; enhancing international exchanges and advanced professional training programs for leaders and members of the democratic forces in skill areas central to the development of civil society; supporting the work of women advocating freedom, human rights, and human progress; supporting the development of Belarusian language education; enhancing the development of the private sector, particularly the information technology sector, and its role in the economy of Belarus, including by increasing the capacity of private sector actors, developing business support organizations, offering entrepreneurship training, and expanding access to finance for small and medium enterprises; supporting political refugees in neighboring European countries fleeing the crackdown in Belarus; supporting the gathering of evidence on and investigating of the human rights abuses in Belarus; supporting the public health response, including filling the information void, in Belarus during the COVID–19 pandemic; and other activities consistent with the purposes of this Act.

(“(d) Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that, in light of the political crisis in Belarus and the unprecedented mobilization of the Belarusian people, United States foreign assistance to Belarusian civil society should be reevaluated and increased— to carry out the purposes described in subsection (a); and to include the activities described in subsection (c).

(“(e) Coordination With European Partners.— In order to maximize impact, eliminate duplication, and further the achievement of the purposes described in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordination with the European Union and its institutions, the governments of countries that are members of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

(“(f) Report on Assistance.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 [ Dec. 27, 2020 ], the Secretary of State, acting through the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the programs and activities carried out to achieve the purposes described in subsection (a), including an assessment of whether or not progress was made in achieving those purposes.

(“(g) Authorization of Appropriations.— There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this section such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2021 and 2022.

“SEC. 5 INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREEDOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN BELARUS.

(“(a) Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that— the President should support and reallocate resources to radio, television, and internet broadcasting conducted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in languages spoken in Belarus; the United States should also support other independent media providing objective information to the Belarusian people, particularly in the Belarusian language; the President should provide the United States Agency for Global Media with a surge capacity (as such term is defined in section 316 of the United States International Broadcasting Act [of 1994] ( 22 U.S.C. 6216 )) for programs and activities in Belarus; the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open Technology Fund and in coordination with the Secretary of State, should expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists and civil society in Belarus in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information without fear of repercussions or surveillance; and the United States should continue to condemn the Belarusian authorities’ crackdown on independent media, including the harassment and mass detentions of independent and foreign journalists and the denial of accreditation.

(“(b) Strategy To Promote Expanded Broadcasting, Internet Freedom, and Access to Information in Belarus.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 [ Dec. 27, 2020 ], the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, including a cost estimate, to carry out the following: Expand independent radio, television, live stream, and social network broadcasting and communications in Belarus to provide news and information, particularly in the Belarusian language, that is credible, comprehensive, and accurate. Support the development and use of anti-censorship and circumvention technologies by the Open Technology Fund and the Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor that enable the citizens of Belarus to communicate securely and undertake internet activities without interference from the Government of Belarus. Assist efforts to overcome attempts by the Government of Belarus to disrupt internet access and block content online. Monitor the cooperation of the Government of Belarus with any foreign government or organization for purposes related to the censorship or surveillance of the internet, including an assessment of any such cooperation in the preceding ten years. Monitor the purchase or receipt by the Government of Belarus of any technology or training from any foreign government or organization for purposes related to the censorship or surveillance of the internet, including an assessment of any such purchase or receipt in the preceding ten years. Assist with the protection of journalists who have been targeted for free speech activities, including through the denial of accreditation. Provide cyber-attack mitigation services to civil society organizations in Belarus. Provide resources for educational materials and training on digital literacy, bypassing internet censorship, digital safety, and investigative and analytical journalism for independent journalists working in Belarus. Build the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental and organizations to identify, track, and counter disinformation, including from proxies of the Government of Russia working at Belarusian state television. The report required under paragraph (1) shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

“SEC. 6 SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS.

(“(a) Application of Sanctions.— The sanctions described in subsections (c) through (f) should apply with respect to the Republic of Belarus until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Belarus has made significant progress in meeting the conditions described in subsection (b).

(“(b) Conditions.— The conditions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: The release of individuals in Belarus who have been jailed based on political or religious beliefs or expression, including those individuals jailed based on political beliefs or expression in connection with repression that attended the presidential election of August 9, 2020 . The withdrawal of politically motivated legal charges against all opposition activists, peaceful protesters, and independent journalists in Belarus, including politically motivated legal charges made in connection with repression that attended the presidential election of August 9, 2020 . The cessation of all forms of harassment and repression against the independent media, independent trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, youth groups, religious organizations (including their leadership and members), and the political opposition in Belarus. The prosecution of senior leadership of the Government of Belarus responsible for the administration of fraudulent elections and violations of human rights, including violations of human rights committed in connection with the presidential election of August 9, 2020 . The holding of free, fair and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus consistent with OSCE standards and under the supervision of OSCE observers and independent domestic observers.

(“(c) Denial of Entry Into the United States of Senior Leadership of the Government of Belarus and Russian Individuals Complicit in the Crackdown That Occurred After the August 9, 2020, Election.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may exercise the authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) ) to deny the entry into the United States of any alien who— holds a position in the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus; is an immediate family member of a person inadmissible under paragraph (1); through his or her business dealings with senior leadership of the Government of Belarus derives significant financial benefit from policies or actions, including electoral fraud, human rights abuses, or corruption, that undermine or injure democratic institutions or impede the transition to democracy in Belarus; is a member of the Central Election Commission of Belarus or assisted the Commission in manipulating the presidential election of August 9, 2020 ; is a member of any branch of the security or law enforcement services of Belarus, including the KGB, Interior Ministry, and OMON special police unit, and is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or otherwise directing, the crackdown on opposition leaders, journalists, and peaceful protestors that occurred in connection with the presidential election of August 9, 2020 ; or [sic] is a member of any branch of the security or law enforcement services of Belarus and has participated in the persecution or harassment of religious groups, human rights defenders, democratic opposition groups, or independent media or journalists.[;] is a government official, including at the Information Ministry, responsible for the crackdown on independent media, including revoking the accreditation of journalists, disrupting internet access, and restricting online content; is an official in the so-called ‘Union State’ between Russia and Belarus (regardless of nationality of the individual); or is a Russian individual that has significantly participated in the crackdown on independent press or human rights abuses related to political repression in Belarus, including the Russian propagandists sent to replace local employees at Belarusian state media outlets.

(“(d) Prohibition on Loans and Investment.— It is the sense of Congress that no loan, credit guarantee, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance should be extended by any agency of the Government of the United States (including the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the United States International Development Finance Corporation) to the Government of Belarus, except with respect to the provision of humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. It is the sense of Congress that no funds available to the Trade and Development Agency should be available for activities of the Agency in or for Belarus.

(“(e) Multilateral Financial Assistance.— The Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution of which the United States is a member to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any extension by those institutions of any financial assistance to the Government of Belarus, except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs.

(“(f) Blocking of Assets and Other Prohibited Activities.— It is the sense of Congress that the President should block all property and interests in property, including all commercial, industrial, or public utility undertakings or entities, that, on or after the date of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006 [ Jan. 12, 2007 ]— are owned, in whole or in part, by the Government of Belarus, or by the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus or by any member or family member closely linked to the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus, or an official of the so-called ‘Union State’ with Russia, or any person who through his or her business dealings with senior leadership of the Government of Belarus derives significant financial benefit from policies or actions, including electoral fraud, human rights abuses, or corruption, that undermine or injure democratic institutions or impede the transition to democracy in Belarus; and are in the United States, or in the possession or control of the Government of the United States or of any United States financial institution, including any branch or office of such financial institution that is located outside the United States. Activities prohibited by reason of the blocking of property and interests in property under paragraph (1) should include— payments or transfers of any property, or any transactions involving the transfer of anything of economic value by any United States person, to the Government of Belarus, to any person or entity acting for or on behalf of, or owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by that government, or to any member of the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus, or an official of the so-called ‘Union State’ with Russia; the export or reexport to any entity owned, controlled, or operated by the Government of Belarus, or the so-called ‘Union State’ with Russia,, [sic] directly or indirectly, of any goods, technology, or services, either— by a United States person; or involving the use of any air carrier or a vessel documented under the laws of the United States; and the performance by any United States person of any contract, including a contract providing a loan or other financing, in support of an industrial, commercial, or public utility operated, controlled, or owned by the Government of Belarus. All expenses incident to the blocking and maintenance of property blocked under paragraph (1) should be charged to the owners or operators of such property. Such expenses may not be paid from blocked funds. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit any contract or other financial transaction with any private or nongovernmental organization or business in Belarus. Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to— assistance authorized under section 4 or 5 of this Act; or medicine, medical equipment or supplies, food, as well as any other form of humanitarian assistance provided to Belarus as relief in response to a humanitarian crisis. Any person who violates any prohibition or restriction imposed under this subsection should be subject to the penalties under section 6 [206] of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1705 ) to the same extent as for a violation under that Act [ 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.]. In this subsection: The term ‘air carrier’ has the meaning given that term in section 40102 of title 49 , United States Code. The term ‘United States person’ means— any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; any entity organized under the laws of the United States; and any person in the United States.

“SEC. 7 MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.

“It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to coordinate with the European Union and its institutions, European Union member states, the United Kingdom, and Canada to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy— to further the purposes of this Act, including, as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus that are similar to measures described in this Act; and to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from undermining democratic processes and institutions in Belarus or threatening the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Belarus.

“SEC. 8 REPORTS.

(“(a) Report on Threat to Sovereignty and Independence of Belarus.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 [ Dec. 27, 2020 ], the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing the threat that the Government of Russia poses to the sovereignty and independence of Belarus. The report required under paragraph (1) shall include— an assessment of how the Government of Russia is exploiting the current political crisis in Belarus to push for deeper political and economic control of or integration with Belarus; a description of the economic and energy assets in Belarus that the Government of Russia, including Russian state-owned or state-controlled companies, controls; a description of Belarus major enterprises that are vulnerable of being taken over by Russian entities amid the country’s worsening financial crisis; a description of how and to what ends the Government of Russia seeks to augment its military presence in Belarus; a description of Russian influence over the media and information space in Belarus and how the Government of Russia uses disinformation and other malign techniques to undermine Belarusian history, culture, and language; a description of other actors in Belarus that the Government of Russia uses to advance its malign influence, including veterans’ organizations and extrajudicial networks; a description of efforts to undermine Belarusian language, cultural, and national symbols, including the traditional red and white flag and the ‘Pahonia’ mounted knight; and the identification of Russian individuals and government agencies that are significantly supporting or involved in the crackdown on peaceful protestors and the opposition or the repression of independent media following the August 9, 2020 , presidential election. The report required under this subsection shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(“(b) Report on Personal Assets of Alyaksandr Lukashenka.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 [ Dec. 27, 2020 ], the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing— the total assets under the direct or indirect control of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, including estimated assets and known sources of income of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his immediate family members, including assets, investments, bank accounts, and other business interests; and an identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures in Belarus, as determined by their closeness to Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The Director of National Intelligence may waive, in whole or in part, the reporting requirement under paragraph (1)(A) if the Director submits to the appropriate congressional committees— a written justification stating that the waiver is in the national interest of the United States; and a detailed explanation of the reasons therefor. The report required under this subsection shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

“SEC. 9 DEFINITIONS.

“In this Act: The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means— the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. The term ‘OSCE’ means the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The term ‘senior leadership of the Government of Belarus’ includes— the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, government ministers, Chairmen of State Committees, governors, heads of state enterprises, and members of the Presidential Administration of Belarus; any official of the Government of Belarus who— is personally and substantially involved in the suppression of freedom in Belarus, including judges, prosecutors, members of the security and intelligence services, and heads of professional associations and educational institutions; or is otherwise engaged in public corruption, electoral fraud, online censorship, or restrictions on independent media and journalists in Belarus; and any other individual determined by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary’s designee) to be personally and substantially involved in the formulation or execution of the policies of the Government of Belarus that are in contradiction of internationally recognized human rights standards.”

§ 5812 Program coordination, implementation, and oversight

(a) Coordination The President shall designate, within the Department of State, a coordinator who shall be responsible for— designing an overall assistance and economic cooperation strategy for the independent states of the former Soviet Union; ensuring program and policy coordination among agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in this Act (including the amendments made by this Act and chapter 12 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2296 et seq.]); pursuing coordination with other countries and international organizations with respect to assistance to independent states; ensuring that United States assistance programs for the independent states are consistent with this Act (including the amendments made by this Act and chapter 12 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2296 et seq.]); ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight by agencies responsible for assistance programs for the independent states; and resolving policy and program disputes among United States Government agencies with respect to United States assistance for the independent states.

(b) Export promotion activities Consistent with subsection (a), coordination of activities related to the promotion of exports of United States goods and services to the independent states of the former Soviet Union shall continue to be primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of Commerce, in the Secretary’s role as Chair of the Trade Promotion Coordination Committee.

(c) International economic activities Consistent with subsection (a), coordination of activities relating to United States participation in international financial institutions and relating to organization of multilateral efforts aimed at currency stabilization, currency convertibility, debt reduction, and comprehensive economic reform programs shall continue to be primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury, in the Secretary’s role as Chair of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies and as the United States Governor of the international financial institutions.

(d) Accountability for funds Any agency managing and implementing an assistance program for the independent states of the former Soviet Union shall be accountable for any funds made available to it for such program.

“SEC. 421 PURPOSE.

“The purpose of this subtitle is to establish a training program in Russia and Ukraine for nationals of those countries to obtain skills in business administration, accounting, and marketing, with special emphasis on instruction in business ethics and in the basic terminology, techniques, and practices of those disciplines, to achieve international standards of quality, transparency, and competitiveness.

“SEC. 422 DEFINITIONS.

“In this subtitle: The term ‘distance learning’ means training through computers, interactive videos, teleconferencing, and videoconferencing between and among students and teachers. The term ‘eligible enterprise’ means— in the case of Russia— a business concern operating in Russia that employs Russian nationals in Russia; or a private enterprise that is being formed or operated by former officers of the Russian armed forces in Russia; and in the case of Ukraine— a business concern operating in Ukraine that employs Ukrainian nationals in Ukraine; or a private enterprise that is being formed or operated by former officers of the Ukrainian armed forces in Ukraine. The term ‘eligible national’ means the employee of an eligible enterprise who is employed in the program country. The term ‘program’ means the program of technical assistance established under section 423. The term ‘program country’ means— Russia in the case of any eligible enterprise operating in Russia that receives technical assistance under the program; or Ukraine in the case of any eligible enterprise operating in Ukraine that receives technical assistance under the program.

“SEC. 423 AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAINING PROGRAM AND INTERNSHIPS.

(“(a) Training Program.— The President is authorized to establish a program of technical assistance to provide the training described in section 421 to eligible enterprises. Training shall be carried out by United States nationals having expertise in business administration, accounting, and marketing or by eligible nationals who have been trained under the program. Such training may be carried out— in the offices of eligible enterprises, at business schools or institutes, or at other locations in the program country, including facilities of the armed forces of the program country, educational institutions, or in the offices of trade or industry associations, with special consideration given to locations where similar training opportunities are limited or nonexistent; or by ‘distance learning’ programs originating in the United States or in European branches of United States institutions.

(“(b) Internships With United States Domestic Business Concerns.— Authorized program costs may include the travel expenses and appropriate in-country business English language training, if needed, of eligible nationals who have completed training under the program to undertake short-term internships with business concerns in the United States.

“SEC. 424 APPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

(“(a) Procedures.— Each eligible enterprise that desires to receive training for its employees and managers under this subtitle shall submit an application to the clearinghouse under subsection (c), at such time, in such manner, and accompanied by such additional information as may reasonably be required. A consortium of eligible enterprises may file a joint application under the provisions of paragraph (1).

(“(b) Contents.— An application under subsection (a) may be approved only if the application— is for an individual or individuals employed in an eligible enterprise or enterprises applying under the program; describes the level of training for which assistance under this subtitle is sought; provides evidence that the eligible enterprise meets the general policies adopted for the administration of this subtitle; provides assurances that the eligible enterprise will pay a share of the costs of the training, which share may include in-kind contributions; and provides such additional assurances as are determined to be essential to ensure compliance with the requirements of this subtitle.

(“(c) Clearinghouse.— A clearinghouse shall be established or designated in each program country to manage and execute the program in that country. The clearinghouse shall screen applications, provide information regarding training and teachers, monitor performance of the program, and coordinate appropriate post-program follow-on activities.

“SEC. 425 RESTRICTIONS NOT APPLICABLE.

“Prohibitions on the use of foreign assistance funds for assistance for the Russian Federation or for Ukraine shall not apply with respect to the funds made available to carry out this subtitle.

“SEC. 426 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(“(a) In General.— There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000forthefiscalyear2000and$10,000,000 for the fiscal year 2001 to carry out this subtitle.

(“(b) Availability of Funds.— Amounts appropriated under subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.”

§ 5813 Report on overall assistance and economic cooperation strategy

(a) Requirement for submission As soon as practicable after October 24, 1992 , the coordinator designated pursuant to section 5812(a) of this title shall submit to the Congress a report on the overall assistance and economic cooperation strategy for the independent states of the former Soviet Union that is required to be developed pursuant to paragraph (1) of that section.

(b) Assistance plan The report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include a plan specifying— the amount of the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1993 by chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.] proposed to be allocated for each of the categories of activities authorized by section 498 of that Act [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 ] and to carry out section 5821 of this title (relating to American Business Centers), section 5823 of this title (relating to export promotion activities and capital projects), and subchapter III of this chapter (relating to the Democracy Corps); the amount of other funds made available for fiscal year 1993 to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.] proposed to be allocated for assistance under that Act for the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and the amount of funds available for fiscal year 1993 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.] that are proposed to be made to each agency to carry out activities for the independent states under that Act or this Act.

§ 5814 Repealed. Pub. L. 112–74, div. I, title VII, § 7034(n), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1217

§ 5821 American Business Centers

(a) Establishment The President is authorized and encouraged to establish American Business Centers in the independent states of the former Soviet Union receiving assistance under chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.] where the President determines that such centers can be cost-effective in promoting the objectives described in section 498 of that Act [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 ] and United States economic interests and in establishing commercial partnerships between the people of the United States and the peoples of the independent states.

(b) Environmental business centers and agribusiness centers For purposes of this section, the term “American Business Centers” includes the following: Environmental business centers in those independent states that offer promising market possibilities for the export of United States environmental goods and services. To the maximum extent practicable, these environmental business centers should be established as a component of other centers. Agribusiness centers that include the participation of private United States agribusinesses or agricultural cooperatives, private nonprofit organizations, State universities and land grant colleges, and financial institutions, that make appropriate contributions of equipment, materials, and personnel for the operation of such centers. The purposes of these agribusiness centers shall be— to enhance the ability of farmers and other agribusiness practitioners in the independent states to better meet the needs of the people of the independent states; to assist the transition from a command and control system in agriculture to a free market system; and to facilitate the demonstration and use of United States agricultural equipment and technology.

(c) Additional policy guidance To the maximum extent possible, and consistent with the particular purposes of the specific types of centers, the President should direct that— the American Business Centers established pursuant to this section place special emphasis on assistance to United States small- and medium-sized businesses to facilitate their entry into the commercial markets of the independent states; such centers offer office space, business facilities, and market analysis services to United States firms, trade associations, and State economic development offices on a user-fee basis that minimizes the cost of operating such centers; such centers serve as a repository for commercial, legal, and technical information, including environmental and export control information; such centers identify existing or potential counterpart businesses or organizations that may require specific technical coordination or assistance; such centers be established in several sites in the independent states; and host countries be asked to make appropriate contributions of real estate and personnel for the establishment and operation of such centers.

(d) Funding Not later than 90 days after October 24, 1992 , the Administrator of the Agency for International Development shall conclude a reimbursement agreement with the Secretary of Commerce for the Department of Commerce’s services in establishing and operating American Business Centers pursuant to this section. Of the amount authorized to be appropriated to carry out chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.], up to $12,000,000 for fiscal year 1993 are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose.

§ 5822 Business and Agriculture Advisory Council

(a) Establishment The President is authorized to establish an advisory council to be known as the Independent States Business and Agriculture Advisory Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Council”)— to consult with and advise the President periodically regarding programs of assistance for the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and to evaluate, and consult periodically with the President regarding, the adequacy of bilateral and multilateral assistance programs that would facilitate exports by United States companies to, and investments by United States companies in, the independent states.

(b) Membership The Council should consist of 15 members, appointed by the President, who are drawn from United States companies reflecting diverse businesses and perspectives that have experience and expertise in dealing with the independent states of the former Soviet Union. The President should designate one such member to serve as Chair of the Council. Five such members should be appointed upon the recommendation of the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and 5 should be appointed upon the recommendation of the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate. Members of the Council shall receive no compensation from the United States Government by reason of their service on the Council.

(c) Staff Upon request of the Chair of the Council, the head of any United States Government agency may detail, on a nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of such agency to the Council to assist the Council.

§ 5823 Funding for export promotion activities and capital projects

(a) Allocation of A.I.D. funds The President is encouraged to use a portion of the funds made available for the independent states of the former Soviet Union under chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.]— to fund the export promotion, finance, and related activities carried out pursuant to subsection (b)(1), including activities relating to the export of intermediary goods; and to fund capital projects, including projects for telecommunications, environmental cleanup, power production, and energy related projects.

(b) Export promotion, finance, and related activities The Secretary of Commerce, as Chair of the Trade Promotion Coordination Committee, should, in conjunction with other members of that committee, design and implement programs to provide adequate commercial and technical assistance to United States businesses seeking markets in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, including the following: Increasing the United States and Foreign Commercial Service presence in the independent states, in particular in the Russian Far Eastern cities of Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Preparing profiles of export opportunities for United States businesses in the independent states and providing other technical assistance. Utilizing the Market Development Cooperator Program under section 4723 of title 15 . Developing programs specifically for the purpose of assisting small- and medium-sized businesses in entering commercial markets of the independent states. In carrying out this paragraph, the Secretary of Commerce, to the extent possible, should work directly with private sector organizations with proven experience in trade and economic relations with the independent states. Supporting projects undertaken by the United States business community on the basis of partnership, joint venture, contractual, or other cooperative agreements with appropriate entities in the independent states. Supporting export finance programs, feasibility studies, political risk insurance, and other related programs through increased funding and flexibility in the implementation of such programs. Supporting the Business Information Service (BISNIS) and its related programs.

§ 5824 Interagency working group on energy of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee

The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee should utilize its interagency working group on energy to assist United States energy sector companies to develop a long-term strategy for penetrating the energy market in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. The working group should— work with officials from the independent states in creating an environment conducive to United States energy investment; help to coordinate assistance to United States companies involved with projects to clean up former Soviet nuclear weapons sites and commercial nuclear waste; and work with representatives from United States business and industry involved with the energy sector to help facilitate the identification of business opportunities, including the promotion of oil, gas, and clean coal technology and products, energy efficiency, and the formation of joint ventures between United States companies and companies of the independent nations. ( Pub. L. 102–511, title III, § 304 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3334 .)

§ 5825 Repealed. Pub. L. 104–66, title I, § 1021(e), Dec. 21, 1995, 109 Stat. 713

§ 5826 Policy on combatting tied aid practices

Should the Secretary of the Treasury determine that foreign countries are engaged in tied aid practices with respect to any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union that violate the 1991 Helsinki agreement of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the President should give priority attention to combatting such practices. ( Pub. L. 102–511, title III, § 306 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3335 .)

§ 5827 Technical assistance for Russian Far East

(a) Authorization The President is authorized to provide technical assistance, through an American university in a region which received nonstop air service to and from the Russian Far East as of July 1, 1992 , to facilitate the development of United States business opportunities, free markets, and democratic institutions in the Russian Far East.

(b) Authorization of appropriations There are authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 to carry out subsection (a).

§ 5828 Funding for OPIC programs

(a) Authority to make additional funds available Funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1993 to carry out chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.] may be made available to cover costs incurred by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in carrying out programs with respect to the independent states of the former Soviet Union under title IV of chapter 2 of part I of that Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2191 and following), 1 in addition to amounts otherwise available for that purpose.

(b) Enactment of OPIC Authorization Act The authority of subsection (a) shall cease to be effective upon the enactment of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act Amendments Act of 1992.

§ 5841 Authorization for establishment of Democracy Corps

(a) Establishment; purpose The President is authorized to provide for the establishment of the Democracy Corps as a private nonprofit organization, incorporated in the District of Columbia, whose purpose shall be to maintain a presence in the independent states of the former Soviet Union as described in subsection (c).

(b) Board of Directors The Board of Directors of the Democracy Corps shall have not more than 10 members, appointed by the President. Individuals appointed to the Board— shall, individually or through the organizations they represent, have experience and expertise appropriate to carrying out the purpose of the Democracy Corps, including involvement either with activities of the type described in subsection (d) or in the independent states; shall be United States citizens; and may not be officers or employees of the United States Government or Members of Congress.

(c) Grants to Democracy Corps; purpose The Administrator is authorized to make an annual grant to the Democracy Corps with the funds made available pursuant to this section. The purpose of such grants shall be to enable the Democracy Corps to maintain a presence in independent states of the former Soviet Union that will assist at the local level in the development of— institutions of democratic governance (including judicial, electoral, legislative, and administrative processes), and the nongovernmental organizations of a civil society (including charitable, educational, trade union, business, professional, voluntary, community, and other civic organizations), by mobilizing the expertise of the American people to provide practical assistance through “on the ground” person-to-person advice, technical assistance, and small grants to indigenous individuals and indigenous entities, in accordance with subsection (d).

(d) Activities The Democracy Corps shall be required to carry out its purpose through the placement within the independent states of teams of United States citizens with appropriate expertise and knowledge. Under guidelines developed by the Board, these teams shall assist indigenous individuals and entities in the independent states that are involved in the development of the institutions and organizations referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (c) by— providing advice and technical assistance; making small grants (which in most cases should not exceed $5,000) to such individuals and entities to assist the development of those institutions and organizations; identifying other sources of assistance; and operating local centers to serve as information, logistical, and educational centers and otherwise encourage cooperation and effectiveness by those involved in the development of democratic institutions, a market-oriented economy, and a civil society in the independent states. These local centers may be designated as “Democracy Houses” or given another appropriate appellation.

(e) Grant agreement Grants under this section shall be made pursuant to a grant agreement requiring the Democracy Corps to comply with the requirements specified in this section and with such other terms and conditions as the Administrator may require, which shall include requirements regarding consultation with the coordinator designated pursuant to section 5812(a) of this title , conflicts of interest, and accountability for funds, including a requirement for annual independent audits.

(f) Coordination The Democracy Corps shall be required to— coordinate its activities pursuant to this section with the programs and activities of other entities operating in or providing assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union in support of the development of democratic institutions, a market-oriented economy, and a civil society; and ensure that its activities pursuant to this section are designed to avoid duplication with activities carried out under other United States Government foreign assistance and international information, educational, cultural, and exchange programs.

(g) Prohibition on campaign financing Funds made available to the Democracy Corps under this section may not be expended by the Democracy Corps, or any recipient of a grant from the Democracy Corps, to finance the campaigns of candidates for public office.

(h) Freedom of information Notwithstanding the fact that the Democracy Corps is not an agency or establishment of the United States Government, the Democracy Corps shall be required to comply fully with all of the provisions of section 552 of title 5 . For purposes of complying pursuant to paragraph (1) with section 552(a)(1) of title 5 , the Democracy Corps shall make available to the Administrator such records and other information as the Administrator determines may be necessary for such purposes. The Administrator shall cause such records and other information to be published in the Federal Register. In the event that the Democracy Corps determines not to comply with a request for records under section 552 of title 5 , the Democracy Corps shall submit a report to the Administrator explaining the reasons for not complying with such request. If the Administrator approves such determination, the Agency for International Development shall assume full responsibility, including financial responsibility, for defending the Democracy Corps in any litigation relating to such request. If the Administrator disapproves such determination, the Democracy Corps shall be required to comply with such request.

(i) Annual reports The Board shall be required to submit to the Administrator and the Congress, not later than January 31 each year, a comprehensive report on the activities of the Democracy Corps. Each such report shall list each grant made by the Democracy Corps under subsection (d)(2) during the preceding fiscal year, specifying the grantee and the amount of the grant.

(j) Authorization of appropriations Of the amount authorized to be appropriated to carry out chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.], up to $15,000,000 for fiscal year 1993 are authorized to be appropriated for grants to the Democracy Corps under this section, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose.

(k) Sunset provision Grants may not be made to the Democracy Corps under this section after the end of fiscal year 1997.

(l) Definitions As used in this section— the term “Administrator” means the Administrator of the Agency for International Development; and the term “Board” means the Board of Directors of the Democracy Corps.

§ 5851 Findings

The Congress finds that it is in the national security interest of the United States— to facilitate, on a priority basis— the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction of the independent states of the former Soviet Union; the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons of the independent states, and the establishment of verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons; the prevention of diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise of the former Soviet Union to terrorist groups or third countries; and other efforts designed to reduce the military threat from the former Soviet Union; to support the conversion of the massive defense-related industry and equipment of the independent states of the former Soviet Union for civilian purposes and uses; and to expand military-to-military contacts between the United States and the independent states. ( Pub. L. 102–511, title V, § 501 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3338 .)

§ 5852 Eligibility

Funds may be obligated for a fiscal year for assistance or other programs or activities for an independent state of the former Soviet Union under sections 5853 and 5854 of this title only if the President has certified to the Congress, during that fiscal year, that such independent state is committed to— making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons of mass destruction, if that independent state has an obligation under a treaty or other agreement to destroy or dismantle any such weapons; forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of fissionable or other components of destroyed nuclear weapons; and facilitating United States verification of any weapons destruction carried out under section 5853(a) or 5854(a) of this title or section 212 of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (title II of Public Law 102–228 ; 22 U.S.C. 2551 note). ( Pub. L. 102–511, title V, § 502 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3338 .)

§ 5853 Nonproliferation and disarmament activities in independent states

(a) Authorization The President is authorized to promote bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament activities— by supporting the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, and conventional weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet Union; by supporting bilateral and multilateral efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, related technologies, and other weapons of the independent states, including activities such as— the storage, transportation, and safeguarding of such weapons, and the purchase, barter, or other acquisition of such weapons or materials derived from such weapons; by establishing programs for safeguarding against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and other weapons of the independent states; by establishing programs for preventing diversion of weapons-related scientific and technical expertise of the independent states to terrorist groups or to third countries; by establishing science and technology centers in the independent states for the purpose of engaging weapons scientists and engineers of the independent states (in particular those who were previously involved in the design and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) in productive, nonmilitary undertakings; and by establishing programs for facilitating the conversion of military technologies and capabilities and defense industries of the former Soviet Union into civilian activities.

(b) Funding priorities Priority in carrying out this section shall be given to the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a).

(c) Use of defense funds In recognition of the direct contributions to the national security interests of the United States of the programs and activities authorized by subsection (a), the President is authorized to make available for use in carrying out those programs and activities, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, funds made available pursuant to sections 108 and 109 of Public Law 102–229 or under the amendments made by section 506(a) of this Act. Funds described in paragraph (1) may not be obligated for programs and activities under subsection (a) unless the Director of the Office of Management and Budget has determined that expenditures during fiscal year 1993 pursuant to such obligation shall be counted against the defense category of the discretionary spending limits for that fiscal year (as defined in section 665(a)(2) 1 of title 2) for purposes of part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 [ 2 U.S.C. 900 et seq.].

§ 5854 Nonproliferation and disarmament fund

(a) Authorization The President is authorized to promote bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament activities— by supporting the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, and conventional weapons; by supporting bilateral and multilateral efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, related technologies, and other weapons, including activities such as— the storage, transportation, and safeguarding of such weapons, and the purchase, barter, or other acquisition of such weapons or materials derived from such weapons; by establishing programs for safeguarding against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and other weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet Union; by establishing programs for preventing diversion of weapons-related scientific and technical expertise of the independent states to terrorist groups or to third countries; by establishing science and technology centers in the independent states for the purpose of engaging weapons scientists and engineers of the independent states (in particular those who were previously involved in the design and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) in productive, nonmilitary undertakings; and by establishing programs for facilitating the conversion of military technologies and capabilities and defense industries of the former Soviet Union into civilian activities.

(b) Funding priorities Priority in carrying out this section shall be given to the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a).

(c) Use of security assistance funds In recognition of the direct contributions to the national security interests of the United States of the programs and activities authorized by subsection (a), the President is authorized to make available for use in carrying out those programs and activities, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, up to $100,000,000 of security assistance funds for fiscal year 1993. As used in paragraph (1), the term “security assistance funds” means funds made available for assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.] (relating to the Economic Support Fund) or assistance under section 2763 of this title (relating to the “Foreign Military Financing Program”). Section 531(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2346(e) ], and any provision that corresponds to section 510 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (relating to the prohibition on financing exports of nuclear equipment, fuel, and technology), shall not apply with respect to funds used pursuant to this subsection.

§ 5855 Limitations on defense conversion authorities

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any other provision of this Act), funds may not be obligated in any fiscal year for purposes of facilitating the conversion of military technologies and capabilities and defense industries of the former Soviet Union into civilian activities, as authorized by sections 5853(a)(6) and 5854(a)(6) of this title or any other provision of law, unless the President has previously obligated in the same fiscal year an amount equal to or greater than that amount of funds for defense conversion and defense transition activities in the United States. For purposes of this section, the term “defense conversion and defense transition activities in the United States” means those United States Government funded programs whose primary purpose is to assist United States private sector defense workers, United States companies that manufacture or otherwise provide defense goods or services, or United States communities adversely affected by reductions in United States defense spending, such as programs funded through the Office of Economic Adjustment in the Department of Defense or through the Economic Development Administration. ( Pub. L. 102–511, title V, § 505 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3340 ; Pub. L. 105–277, div. A, § 101(f) [title IV, § 405(d)(20)] , Oct. 21, 1998 , 112 Stat. 2681–337 , 2681–422.)

§ 5856 Soviet weapons destruction

(a) , (b) Omitted

(c) Avoidance of duplicative amendments The amendments made by this section shall not be effective if the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 enacts an amendment to section 221(a) of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 that authorizes the transfer of an amount that is the same or greater than the amount that is authorized by the amendment made by subsection (a)(1) of this section and enacts amendments identical to those in subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section. If that Act enacts such amendments, sections 5853 and 5858 of this title shall be deemed to apply with respect to the funds made available under such amendments.

§ 5857 Waiver of certain provisions

(a) In general Funds made available for fiscal year 1993 under sections 5853 and 5854 of this title to provide assistance or otherwise carry out programs and activities with respect to the independent states of the former Soviet Union under those sections may be used notwithstanding any other provision of law, other than the provisions cited in subsection (b).

(b) Exceptions Subsection (a) does not apply with respect to— this subchapter; and section 1341 of title 31 (commonly referred to as the “Anti-Deficiency Act”), the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.

§ 5858 Notice and reports to Congress

(a) Notice of proposed obligations Not less than 15 days before obligating any funds under section 5853 or 5854 of this title or the amendments made by section 506(a), 1 the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the appropriate congressional committees a report on the proposed obligation. Each such report shall specify— the account, budget activity, and particular program or programs from which the funds proposed to be obligated are to be derived and the amount of the proposed obligations; and the activities and forms of assistance for which the President plans to obligate such funds.

(b) Semiannual report Not later than April 30, 1993 , and not later than October 30, 1993 , the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities carried out under sections 5853 and 5854 of this title and the amendments made by section 506(a). 1 Each such report shall set forth, for the preceding 6-month period and cumulatively, the following: The amounts expended for such activities and the purposes for which they were expended. The source of the funds obligated for such activities, specified by program. A description of the participation of all United States Government departments and agencies in such activities. A description of the activities carried out and the forms of assistance provided. Such other information as the President considers appropriate to fully inform the Congress concerning the operation of the programs and activities carried out under sections 5853 and 5854 of this title and the amendments made by section 506(a). 1

(c) Appropriate congressional committees As used in this section— the term “appropriate congressional committees” means— the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations of the House and the Senate, wherever the account, budget activity, or program is funded from appropriations made under the international affairs budget function (150); the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, wherever the account, budget activity, or program is funded from appropriations made under the national defense budget function (050); and the committee to which the specified activities of section 5853(a) or 5854(a) of this title or subtitle B 1 of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (as the case may be), if the subject of separate legislation, would be referred, under the rules of the respective House of Congress.

§ 5859 International nonproliferation initiative

(a) to (e) Omitted

(f) Avoidance of duplicative authorizations This section shall not apply if the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 enacts the same authorities and requirements as are contained in this section and authorizes the appropriation of the same (or a greater) amount to carry out such authorities.

§ 5859a International nonproliferation initiative

(a) Assistance for international nonproliferation activities Subject to the limitations and requirements provided in this section, the Secretary of Defense, under the guidance of the President, may provide assistance to support international nonproliferation activities.

(b) Activities for which assistance may be provided Activities for which assistance may be provided under this section are activities such as the following: Activities carried out by international organizations that are designed to ensure more effective safeguards against proliferation and more effective verification of compliance with international agreements on nonproliferation. Activities of the Department of Defense in support of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (or any successor organization). Collaborative international nuclear security and nuclear safety projects to combat the threat of nuclear theft, terrorism, or accidents, including joint emergency response exercises, technical assistance, and training. Efforts to improve international cooperative monitoring of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile proliferation through technical projects and improved information sharing.

(c) Form of assistance Assistance under this section may include funds and in-kind contributions of supplies, equipment, personnel, training, and other forms of assistance. Assistance under this section may be provided to international organizations in the form of funds only if the amount in the “Contributions to International Organizations” account of the Department of State is insufficient or otherwise unavailable to meet the United States fair share of assessments for international nuclear nonproliferation activities. No amount may be obligated for an expenditure under this section unless the Director of the Office of Management and Budget determines that the expenditure will be counted as discretionary spending in the national defense budget function (function 050). No assistance may be furnished under this section unless the Secretary of Defense determines and certifies to the Congress 30 days in advance that the provision of such assistance— is in the national security interest of the United States; and will not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. The authority to provide assistance under this section in the form of funds may be exercised only to the extent and in the amounts provided in advance in appropriations Act.

(d) Sources of assistance Funds provided as assistance under this section for any fiscal year shall be derived from amounts made available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year. Funds provided as assistance under this section for a fiscal year may also be derived from balances in working capital accounts of the Department of Defense. Supplies and equipment provided as assistance under this section may be provided, by loan or donation, from existing stocks of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. The total amount of the assistance provided in the form of funds under this section, including funds used for activities of the Department of Defense in support of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, may not exceed $25,000,000forfiscalyear1994,$20,000,000 for fiscal year 1995, $15,000,000forfiscalyear1996,$15,000,000 for fiscal year 1997, or $15,000,000 for fiscal year 1998. In the event of a significant unforeseen development related to the activities of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (or any successor organization) for which the Secretary of Defense determines that financial assistance under this section is required at a level which would result in the total amount of assistance provided under this section during the then-current fiscal year exceeding the amount of any limitation provided by law on the total amount of such assistance for that fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense may provide such assistance with respect to that fiscal year notwithstanding that limitation. Funds for such purpose may be derived from any funds available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year. Financial assistance may be provided under subparagraph (A) only after the Secretary of Defense provides notice in writing to the committees of Congress named in subsection (e)(2) of the significant unforeseen development and of the Secretary’s intent to provide assistance in excess of the limitation for that fiscal year. However, if the Secretary determines in any case that under the specific circumstances of that case advance notice is not possible, such notice shall be provided as soon as possible and not later than 15 days after the date on which the assistance is provided. Any notice under this subparagraph shall include a description of the development, the amount of assistance provided or to be provided, and the source of the funds for that assistance.

(e) Quarterly report Not later than 30 days after the end of each quarter of a fiscal year during which the authority of the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance under this section is in effect, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the committees of Congress named in paragraph (2) a report of the activities to reduce the proliferation threat carried out under this section. Each report shall set forth (for the preceding quarter and cumulatively)— the amounts spent for such activities and the purposes for which they were spent; a description of the participation of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy and the participation of other Government agencies in those activities; and a description of the activities for which the funds were spent. The committees of Congress to which reports under paragraph (1) are to be transmitted are— the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on International Relations, and the Committee on Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(f) Termination of authority The authority of the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance under this section terminates at the close of fiscal year 2003.

§ 5860 Report on special nuclear materials

Not later than 180 days after October 24, 1992 , the Secretary of State shall prepare, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, and shall transmit to the Congress a report on the possible alternatives for the ultimate disposition of special nuclear materials of the former Soviet Union. This report shall include— a cost-benefit analysis comparing (A) the relative merits of the indefinite storage and safeguarding of such materials in the independent states of the former Soviet Union and (B) its acquisition by the United States by purchase, barter, or other means; a discussion of relevant issues such as the protection of United States uranium producers from dumping, the relative vulnerability of these stocks of special nuclear materials to illegal proliferation, and the potential electrical and other savings associated with their being made available in the fuel cycle in the United States; and a discussion of how highly enriched uranium stocks could be diluted for reactor fuel. ( Pub. L. 102–511, title V, § 510 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3344 .)

§ 5861 Research and Development Foundation

(a) Establishment The Director of the National Science Foundation (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Director”) is authorized to establish an endowed, nongovernmental, nonprofit foundation (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Foundation”) in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

(b) Purposes The purposes of the Foundation shall be the following: To provide productive research and development opportunities within the independent states of the former Soviet Union that offer scientists and engineers alternatives to emigration and help prevent the dissolution of the technological infrastructure of the independent states. To advance defense conversion by funding civilian collaborative research and development projects between scientists and engineers in the United States and in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. To assist in the establishment of a market economy in the independent states of the former Soviet Union by promoting, identifying, and partially funding joint research, development, and demonstration ventures between United States businesses and scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs in those independent states. To provide a mechanism for scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs in the independent states of the former Soviet Union to develop an understanding of commercial business practices by establishing linkages to United States scientists, engineers, and businesses. To provide access for United States businesses to sophisticated new technologies, talented researchers, and potential new markets within the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

(c) Functions In carrying out its purposes, the Foundation shall— promote and support joint research and development projects for peaceful purposes between scientists and engineers in the United States and independent states of the former Soviet Union on subjects of mutual interest; and seek to establish joint nondefense industrial research, development, and demonstration activities through private sector linkages which may involve participation by scientists and engineers in the university or academic sectors, and which shall include some contribution from industrial participants.

(d) Funding To the extent funds appropriated to carry out subtitle E of title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 [ 22 U.S.C. 5931 ] (relating to joint research and development programs with the independent states of the former Soviet Union) are otherwise available for such purpose, such funds may be made available to the Director for use by the Director in establishing the endowment of the Foundation and otherwise carrying out this section. For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1993, not more than 50 percent of the funds made available to the Foundation by the United States Government may be funds appropriated in the national defense budget function (function 050). As a condition of participation in the Foundation, an independent state of the former Soviet Union must make a minimum contribution to the endowment of the Foundation, as determined by the Director, which shall reflect the ability of the independent state to make a financial contribution and its expected level of participation in the Foundation’s programs. To the extent provided in advance by appropriations Acts, local currencies or other assets resulting from government-to-government debt conversions may be made available to the Foundation. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “debt conversion” means an agreement whereby a country’s government-to-government or commercial external debt burden is exchanged by the holder for local currencies, policy commitments, other assets, or other economic activities, or for an equity interest in an enterprise theretofore owned by the debtor government. In addition to other uses provided by law, and subject to agreement with the foreign government, local currencies generated by United States assistance programs may be made available to the Foundation. The Foundation may invest any revenue provided to it through United States Government assistance, and any interest earned on such investment may be used only for the purpose for which the assistance was provided. The Foundation may accept such other funds as may be provided to it by Government agencies or nongovernmental entities.

§ 5871 Facilitating discussions regarding acquisition of space hardware, technology, and services from former Soviet Union

(a) Expedited review Any request for a license or other approval described in subsection (c) that is submitted to any United States Government agency by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, any of its contractors, or any other person shall be considered on an expedited basis by that agency and any other agency involved in an applicable interagency review process.

(b) Notice to Congress if license denied If any United States Government agency denies a request for a license or other approval described in subsection (c), that agency shall immediately notify the designated congressional committees. Each such notification shall include a statement of the reasons for the denial.

(c) Description of discussions This section applies to a request for any license or other approval that may be necessary to conduct discussions with an independent state of the former Soviet Union with respect to the possible acquisition of any space hardware, space technology, or space service for integration into— United States space projects that have been approved by the Congress, or commercial space ventures, including discussions relating to technical evaluation of such hardware, technology, or service.

§ 5872 Office of Space Commerce

(a) Trade missions The Office of Space Commerce of the Department of Commerce is authorized and encouraged to conduct one or more trade missions to appropriate independent states of the former Soviet Union for the purpose of familiarizing United States aerospace industry representatives with space hardware, space technologies, and space services that may be available from the independent states, and with the business practices and overall business climate in the independent states.

(b) Monitoring negotiations The Office of Space Commerce— shall monitor the progress of any discussions described in section 5871(c)(1) of this title that are being conducted; and shall advise the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as to the impact on United States industry of each potential acquisition of space hardware, space technology, or space services from the independent states of the former Soviet Union, specifically including any anticompetitive issues the Office may observe.

§ 5873 Report to Congress

Within one year after October 24, 1992 , the President shall submit to the designated congressional committees a report describing— the opportunities for increased space-related trade with the independent states of the former Soviet Union; a technology procurement plan for identifying and evaluating all unique space hardware, space technology, and space services available to the United States from the independent states; specific space hardware, space technology, and space services that have been, or could be, the subject of discussions described in section 5871(c) of this title ; the trade missions carried out pursuant to section 5872(a) of this title , including the private participation in and the results of such missions; any barriers, regulatory or practical, that inhibit space-related trade between the United States and independent states, including any such barriers in either the United States or the independent states; and any anticompetitive issues raised during the course of negotiations, as observed pursuant to section 5872(b) of this title . ( Pub. L. 102–511, title VI, § 603 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3347 .)

§ 5874 Definitions

For purposes of this subchapter— the term “contractor” means a National Aeronautics and Space Administration contractor to the extent that the acquisition of space hardware, space technology, or space services from the independent states of the former Soviet Union may be relevant to the contractor’s responsibilities under the contract; and the term “designated congressional committees” means the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. ( Pub. L. 102–511, title VI, § 604 , Oct. 24, 1992 , 106 Stat. 3348 .)