CHAPTER 40 - DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Title 50 > CHAPTER 40

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§ 2301 Findings

Congress makes the following findings: Weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies are increasingly available from worldwide sources. Technical information relating to such weapons is readily available on the Internet, and raw materials for chemical, biological, and radiological weapons are widely available for legitimate commercial purposes. The former Soviet Union produced and maintained a vast array of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Many of the states of the former Soviet Union retain the facilities, materials, and technologies capable of producing additional quantities of weapons of mass destruction. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union was accompanied by disruptions of command and control systems, deficiencies in accountability for weapons, weapons-related materials and technologies, economic hardships, and significant gaps in border control among the states of the former Soviet Union. The problems of organized crime and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union increase the potential for proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials. The conditions described in paragraph (4) have substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies from within the states of the former Soviet Union and from unemployed scientists who worked on those programs. As a result of such conditions, the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history. The President has identified North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya as hostile states which already possess some weapons of mass destruction and are developing others. The acquisition or the development and use of weapons of mass destruction is well within the capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, acting independently or as proxies for foreign states. Foreign states can transfer weapons to or otherwise aid extremist and terrorist movements indirectly and with plausible deniability. Terrorist groups have already conducted chemical attacks against civilian targets in the United States and Japan, and a radiological attack in Russia. The potential for the national security of the United States to be threatened by nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological terrorism must be taken seriously. There is a significant and growing threat of attack by weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not military targets in the usual sense of the term. Concomitantly, the threat posed to the citizens of the United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing. Mass terror may result from terrorist incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials. Facilities required for production of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are much smaller and harder to detect than nuclear weapons facilities, and biological and chemical weapons can be deployed by alternative delivery means other than long-range ballistic missiles. Covert or unconventional means of delivery of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons include cargo ships, passenger aircraft, commercial and private vehicles and vessels, and commercial cargo shipments routed through multiple destinations. Traditional arms control efforts assume large state efforts with detectable manufacturing programs and weapons production programs, but are ineffective in monitoring and controlling smaller, though potentially more dangerous, unconventional proliferation efforts. Conventional counterproliferation efforts would do little to detect or prevent the rapid development of a capability to suddenly manufacture several hundred chemical or biological weapons with nothing but commercial supplies and equipment. The United States lacks adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism. The Department of Energy has established a Nuclear Emergency Response Team which is available in case of nuclear or radiological emergencies, but no comparable units exist to deal with emergencies involving biological or chemical weapons or related materials. State and local emergency response personnel are not adequately prepared or trained for incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials. Exercises of the Federal, State, and local response to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism have revealed serious deficiencies in preparedness and severe problems of coordination. The development of, and allocation of responsibilities for, effective countermeasures to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism in the United States requires well-coordinated participation of many Federal agencies, and careful planning by the Federal Government and State and local governments. Training and exercises can significantly improve the preparedness of State and local emergency response personnel for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials. Sharing of the expertise and capabilities of the Department of Defense, which traditionally has provided assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of explosive ordnance, as well as radiological, biological, and chemical materials, can be a vital contribution to the development and deployment of countermeasures against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. The United States lacks effective policy coordination regarding the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1402 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2715 .)

“SEC. 1401 SHORT TITLE.

“This title may be cited as the ‘Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998’.

“SEC. 1402 DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE TO THREATS OF TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(“(a) Enhanced Response Capability.— In light of the continuing potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States and the need to develop a more fully coordinated response to that threat on the part of Federal, State, and local agencies, the President shall act to increase the effectiveness at the Federal, State, and local level of the domestic emergency preparedness program for response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction by utilizing the President’s existing authorities to develop an integrated program that builds upon the program established under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104–201 ; 110 Stat. 2714 ; 50 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).

(“(b) Report.— Not later than January 31, 1999 , the President shall submit to Congress a report containing information on the actions taken at the Federal, State, and local level to develop an integrated program to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

“SEC. 1403 REPORT ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

“SEC. 1404 THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS.

(“(a) Threat and Risk Assessments.— Assistance to Federal, State, and local agencies provided under the program under section 1402 shall include the performance of assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist employment of weapons of mass destruction against cities and other local areas. Such assessments shall be used by Federal, State, and local agencies to determine the training and equipment requirements under this program and shall be performed as a collaborative effort with State and local agencies.

(“(b) Conduct of Assessments.— The Department of Justice, as lead Federal agency for domestic crisis management in response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, shall— conduct any threat and risk assessment performed under subsection (a) in coordination with appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies; and develop procedures and guidance for conduct of the threat and risk assessment in consultation with officials from the intelligence community.

“SEC. 1405 ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(“(a) Requirement for Panel.— The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center to establish a panel to assess the capabilities for domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.

(“(b) Composition of Panel; Selection.— The panel shall be composed of members who shall be private citizens of the United States with knowledge and expertise in emergency response matters. Members of the panel shall be selected by the federally funded research and development center in accordance with the terms of the contract established pursuant to subsection (a).

(“(c) Procedures for Panel.— The federally funded research and development center shall be responsible for establishing appropriate procedures for the panel, including procedures for selection of a panel chairman.

(“(d) Duties of Panel.— The panel shall— assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions; recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; and assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in funding effective local response capabilities.

(“(e) Deadline To Enter Into Contract.— The Secretary of Defense shall enter into the contract required under subsection (a) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [ Oct. 17, 1998 ].

(“(f) Deadline for Selection of Panel Members.— Selection of panel members shall be made not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary enters into the contract required by subsection (a).

(“(g) Initial Meeting of the Panel.— The panel shall conduct its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date that all the selections to the panel have been made.

(“(h) Reports.— Not later than 6 months after the date of the first meeting of the panel, the panel shall submit to the President and to Congress an initial report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Not later than December 15 of each year, beginning in 1999 and ending in 2003, the panel shall submit to the President and to the Congress a report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

(“(i) Cooperation of Other Agencies.— The panel may secure directly from the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or any other Federal department or agency information that the panel considers necessary for the panel to carry out its duties. The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and any other official of the United States shall provide the panel with full and timely cooperation in carrying out its duties under this section.

(“(j) Funding.— The Secretary of Defense shall provide the funds necessary for the panel to carry out its duties from the funds available to the Department of Defense for weapons of mass destruction preparedness initiatives.

(“(k) Compensation of Panel Members.— The provisions of paragraph (4) of section 591(c) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(d) of division A of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 ( Public Law 105–277 ; 112 Stat. 2681–212 )), shall apply to members of the panel in the same manner as to members of the National Commission on Terrorism under that paragraph.

(“(l) Termination of the Panel.— The panel shall terminate five years after the date of the appointment of the member selected as chairman of the panel.

(“(m) Definition.— In this section, the term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ has the meaning given that term in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 ( 50 U.S.C. 2302(1) ).”

§ 2302 Definitions

In this chapter: The term “weapon of mass destruction” means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of— toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity. The term “independent states of the former Soviet Union” has the meaning given that term in section 5801 of title 22 . The term “highly enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U–235. ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1403 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2717 .)

§ 2311 Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction

(a) Enhanced response capability In light of the potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, the President shall take immediate action— to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; and to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents at both the national and the local level.

(b) Report required Not later than January 31, 1997 , the President shall transmit to Congress a report containing— an assessment of the capabilities of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local prevention and response efforts; requirements for improvements in those capabilities; and the measures that should be taken to achieve such improvements, including additional resources and legislative authorities that would be required.

§ 2312 Repealed. Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title X, § 1034, Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3429

§ 2313 Nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency response

(a) Department of Defense The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is responsible for the coordination of Department of Defense assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to threats involving nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, or high-yield explosives or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, and high-yield explosives and related materials and technologies.

(b) Department of Energy The Secretary of Energy shall designate an official within the Department of Energy as the executive agent for— the coordination of Department of Energy assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to threats involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of nuclear weapons and related materials and technologies; and the coordination of Department of Energy assistance to the Department of Defense in carrying out that department’s responsibilities under subsection (a).

(c) Funding Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, 1 $15,000,000 is available for providing assistance described in subsection (a).

§ 2314 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives response team

(a) Department of Defense rapid response team The Secretary of Defense shall develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of the Department of Defense who are capable of aiding Federal, State, and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives.

(b) Addition to Federal response plans The Secretary of Homeland Security shall incorporate into the National Response Plan prepared pursuant to section 502(6) 1 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 312(6) ), other existing Federal emergency response plans, and programs prepared under section 5196(b) of title 42 guidance on the use and deployment of the rapid response teams established under this section to respond to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall carry out this subsection in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other Federal agencies involved with the emergency response plans.

§ 2315 Testing of preparedness for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons

(a) Emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop and carry out a program for testing and improving the responses of Federal, State, and local agencies to emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials. The program shall include exercises to be carried out in accordance with sections 112(c) and 238(c)(1) of title 6. In developing and carrying out the program, the Secretary shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of any other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have an expertise or responsibilities relevant to emergencies described in paragraph (1).

(b) Annual revisions of programs The Secretary of Homeland Security shall revise the program developed under subsection (a) not later than June 1 in each fiscal year covered by the program. The revisions shall include adjustments that the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate on the basis of the lessons learned from the exercise or exercises carried out under the program in the fiscal year, including lessons learned regarding coordination problems and equipment deficiencies.

§ 2316 Actions to increase civilian expertise

(a) to (c) Omitted

(d) Civilian expertise The President shall take reasonable measures to reduce the reliance of civilian law enforcement officials on Department of Defense resources to counter the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States. The measures shall include— actions to increase civilian law enforcement expertise to counter such a threat; and actions to improve coordination between civilian law enforcement officials and other civilian sources of expertise, within and outside the Federal Government, to counter such a threat.

(e) Reports The President shall submit to Congress the following reports: Not later than 90 days after September 23, 1996 , a report describing the respective policy functions and operational roles of Federal agencies in countering the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States. Not later than one year after September 23, 1996 , a report describing— the actions planned to be taken to carry out subsection (d); and the costs of such actions. Not later than three years after September 23, 1996 , a report updating the information provided in the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), including the measures taken pursuant to subsection (d).

§ 2317 Rapid response information system

(a) Inventory of rapid response assets The head of each Federal Response Plan agency shall develop and maintain an inventory of physical equipment and assets under the jurisdiction of that agency that could be made available to aid State and local officials in search and rescue and other disaster management and mitigation efforts associated with an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction. The agency head shall submit a copy of the inventory, and any updates of the inventory, to the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency for inclusion in the master inventory required under subsection (b). Each inventory shall include a separate listing of any equipment that is excess to the needs of that agency and could be considered for disposal as excess or surplus property for use for response and training with regard to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

(b) Master inventory The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall compile and maintain a comprehensive listing of all inventories prepared under subsection (a). The first such master list shall be completed not later than December 31, 1997 , and shall be updated annually thereafter.

(c) Addition to Federal response plan Not later than December 31, 1997 , the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall develop and incorporate into existing Federal emergency response plans and programs prepared under section 5196(b) of title 42 guidance on accessing and using the physical equipment and assets included in the master list developed under subsection 1 to respond to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

(d) Database on chemical and biological materials The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall prepare a database on chemical and biological agents and munitions characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use. The initial design and compilation of the database shall be completed not later than December 31, 1997 .

(e) Access to inventory and database The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall design and maintain a system to give Federal, State, and local officials access to the inventory listing and database maintained under this section in the event of an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction or to prepare and train to respond to such an emergency. The system shall include a secure but accessible emergency response hotline to access information and request assistance.

§ 2331 Procurement of detection equipment for United States border security

Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301, 1 $15,000,000 is available for the procurement of— equipment capable of detecting the movement of weapons of mass destruction and related materials into the United States; equipment capable of interdicting the movement of weapons of mass destruction and related materials into the United States; and materials and technologies related to use of equipment described in paragraph (1) or (2). ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1421 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2725 .)

§ 2332 Sense of Congress concerning criminal penalties

(a) Sense of Congress concerning inadequacy of sentencing guidelines It is the sense of Congress that the sentencing guidelines prescribed by the United States Sentencing Commission for the offenses of importation, attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials constitute inadequate punishment for such offenses.

(b) Urging of revision to guidelines Congress urges the United States Sentencing Commission to revise the relevant sentencing guidelines to provide for increased penalties for offenses relating to importation, attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies under the following provisions of law: Section 4610 1 of this title. Sections 2778 and 2780 of title 22. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Section 2139a(c) of title 42 .

§ 2333 International border security

(a) Secretary of Defense responsibility The Secretary of Defense, in consultation and cooperation with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, shall carry out programs for assisting customs officials and border guard officials in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic states, and other countries of Eastern Europe in preventing unauthorized transfer and transportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials. Training, expert advice, maintenance of equipment, loan of equipment, and audits may be provided under or in connection with the programs.

(b) Other countries The Secretary of Defense may carry out programs under subsection (a) in a country other than a country specified in that subsection if the Secretary determines that there exists in that country a significant threat of the unauthorized transfer and transportation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials.

(c) Assistance to states of former Soviet Union Assistance under programs referred to in subsection (a) may (notwithstanding any provision of law prohibiting the extension of foreign assistance to any of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union) be extended to include an independent state of the former Soviet Union if the President certifies to Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to extend assistance under this section to that state.

§ 2334 Training program

The Secretary of Defense may participate in a training program carried out jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to expand and improve United States efforts to deter the possible proliferation and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by organized crime organizations in Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries, states of the former Soviet Union, and in other countries in which, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, there exists a significant threat of such proliferation and acquisition. ( Pub. L. 103–337, div. A, title XV, § 1504(e)(3)(A) , Oct. 5, 1994 , 108 Stat. 2918 ; Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title XII, § 1211(b) , Oct. 28, 2004 , 118 Stat. 2087 .)

§ 2341 Elimination of plutonium production

(a) Replacement program The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a cooperative program with the Government of Russia to eliminate the production of weapons grade plutonium by modifying or replacing the reactor cores at Tomsk–7 and Krasnoyarsk–26 with reactor cores that are less suitable for the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

(b) Program requirements The program shall be designed to achieve completion of the modifications or replacements of the reactor cores within three years after the modification or replacement activities under the program are begun. The plan for the program shall— specify— successive steps for the modification or replacement of the reactor cores; and clearly defined milestones to be achieved; and include estimates of the costs of the program.

(c) Submission of program plan to Congress Not later than 180 days after September 23, 1996 , the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress— a plan for the program under subsection (a); an estimate of the United States funding that is necessary for carrying out the activities under the program for each fiscal year covered by the program; and a comparison of the benefits of the program with the benefits of other nonproliferation programs.

§ 2342 Cooperative program on research, development, and demonstration of technology regarding nuclear or radiological terrorism

(a) Program required The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall carry out with the Russian Federation a cooperative program on the research, development, and demonstration of technologies for protection from and response to nuclear or radiological terrorism.

(b) Program elements In carrying out the program required by subsection (a), the Administrator shall— conduct research and development of technology for protection from nuclear or radiological terrorism, including technology for the detection, identification, assessment, control, and disposition of radiological materials that could be used for nuclear terrorism; and provide, where feasible, for the demonstration to other countries of technologies or methodologies on matters relating to nuclear or radiological terrorism, including— the demonstration of technologies developed under the program to respond to nuclear or radiological terrorism; the demonstration of technologies developed under the program for the disposal of radioactive materials; the demonstration of methodologies developed under the program for use in evaluating the radiological threat of radiological sources identified as not under current accounting programs in the audit report of the Inspector General of the Department of Energy titled “Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign Countries” (DOE/IG–0546); in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the demonstration of methodologies developed under the program to facilitate the development of a regulatory framework for licensing and controlling radioactive sources; and in coordination with the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health of the Department of Energy, the demonstration of methodologies developed under the program to facilitate development of consistent criteria for screening international transfers of radiological materials.

(c) Consultation In carrying out activities in accordance with subsection (b)(2), the Administrator shall consult with— the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Commerce; and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(d) Amount for activities Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) 1 for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $15,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section.

§ 2343 Matters relating to the international materials protection, control, and accounting program of the Department of Energy

(a) Radiological dispersal device materials protection, control, and accounting The Secretary of Energy may establish within the International Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program of the Department of Energy a program on the protection, control, and accounting of materials usable in radiological dispersal devices. In establishing such program, the Secretary shall— identify the sites and radiological materials to be covered by such program; carry out a risk assessment of such radiological materials; and identify and establish the costs of and schedules for such program.

(b) Revised focus for materials protection, control, and accounting program of Russian Federation The Secretary of Energy shall work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to develop, as soon as practicable but not later than January 1, 2018 , a sustainable nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting system for the nuclear materials of the Russian Federation that is supported solely by the Russian Federation. The Secretary shall work with the Russian Federation to identify various alternatives to provide the United States adequate transparency in the nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting program of the Russian Federation to assure that such program is meeting applicable goals for nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting.

(c) Amount for activities Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) 1 for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $5,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section.

§ 2344 Strengthened international security for nuclear materials and security of nuclear operations

(a) Report on options for international program to strengthen security Not later than 270 days after December 2, 2002 , the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on options for an international program to develop strengthened security for nuclear reactors and associated materials outside the United States. In evaluating options for purposes of the report, the Secretary shall consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the feasibility and advisability of actions to reduce the risks associated with terrorist attacks on nuclear reactors outside the United States.

(b) Joint programs with Russia on proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies The Secretary shall pursue with the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation joint programs between the United States and the Russian Federation on the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies, including advanced fuel cycles. Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) 1 for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $10,000,000 may be available for carrying out the joint programs referred to in paragraph (1).

(c) Assistance regarding hostile insiders The Secretary may, utilizing appropriate expertise of the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provide technical assistance to nuclear reactor facilities outside the United States with respect to the interdiction of hostile insiders at such facilities in order to prevent incidents arising from the disablement of the vital systems of such facilities.

§ 2345 Export control programs

(a) Authority to pursue options for strengthening export control programs The Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of State, may pursue in the region of the former Soviet Union and other regions of concern options for accelerating programs that assist the countries in such regions in improving their domestic export control programs for materials, technologies, and expertise relevant to the construction or use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device.

(b) Amount for activities Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) 1 for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $5,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section.

§ 2351 National coordinator on nonproliferation

(a) Designation of position The President shall designate an individual to serve in the Executive Office of the President as the National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters.

(b) Duties The Coordinator, under the direction of the National Security Council, shall advise and assist the President by— advising the President on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including issues related to terrorism, arms control, and international organized crime; chairing the Committee on Nonproliferation of the National Security Council; and taking such actions as are necessary to ensure that there is appropriate emphasis in, cooperation on, and coordination of, nonproliferation research efforts of the United States, including activities of Federal agencies as well as activities of contractors funded by the Federal Government.

(c) Allocation of funds Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, 1 $2,000,000 is available to the Department of Defense for carrying out research referred to in subsection (b)(3).

§ 2352 National Security Council Committee on Nonproliferation

(a) Establishment The Committee on Nonproliferation (in this section referred to as the “Committee”) is established as a committee of the National Security Council.

(b) Membership The Committee shall be composed of representatives of the following: The Secretary of State. The Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence. The Attorney General. The Secretary of Energy. The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary of Commerce. Such other members as the President may designate. The National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters shall chair the Committee on Nonproliferation.

(c) Responsibilities The Committee has the following responsibilities: To review and coordinate Federal programs, policies, and directives relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies, including matters relating to terrorism and international organized crime. To make recommendations through the National Security Council to the President regarding the following: Integrated national policies for countering the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. Options for integrating Federal agency budgets for countering such threats. Means to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments have adequate capabilities to manage crises involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies, and to manage the consequences of a use of such weapon or related materials or technologies, and that use of those capabilities is coordinated. Means to ensure appropriate cooperation on, and coordination of, the following: Preventing the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies. Promoting domestic and international law enforcement efforts against proliferation-related efforts. Countering the involvement of organized crime groups in proliferation-related activities. Safeguarding weapons of mass destruction materials and related technologies. Improving coordination and cooperation among intelligence activities, law enforcement, and the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy in support of nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts. Improving export controls over materials and technologies that can contribute to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.

§ 2353 Comprehensive preparedness program

(a) Program required The President, acting through the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title , shall develop a comprehensive program for carrying out this chapter.

(b) Content of program The program set forth in the report shall include specific plans as follows: Plans for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies. Plans for training and equipping Federal, State, and local officials for managing a crisis involving a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction, including the consequences of the use of such a weapon. Plans for providing for regular sharing of information among intelligence, law enforcement, and customs agencies. Plans for training and equipping law enforcement units, customs services, and border security personnel to counter the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies. Plans for establishing appropriate centers for analyzing seized nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, and related materials and technologies. Plans for establishing in the United States appropriate legal controls and authorities relating to the exporting of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, and related materials and technologies. Plans for encouraging and assisting governments of foreign countries to implement and enforce laws that set forth appropriate penalties for offenses regarding the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies. Plans for building the confidence of the United States and Russia in each other’s controls over United States and Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials, including plans for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Plans for reducing United States and Russian stockpiles of excess plutonium, reflecting— consideration of the desirability and feasibility of a United States-Russian agreement governing fissile material disposition and the specific technologies and approaches to be used for disposition of excess plutonium; and an assessment of the options for United States cooperation with Russia in the disposition of Russian plutonium. Plans for studying the merits and costs of establishing a global network of means for detecting and responding to terroristic or other criminal use of biological agents against people or other forms of life in the United States or any foreign country.

(c) Report At the same time that the President submits the budget for fiscal year 1998 to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31 , the President shall submit to Congress a report that sets forth the comprehensive program developed under subsection (a). The report shall include the following: The specific plans for the program that are required under subsection (b). Estimates of the funds necessary, by agency or department, for carrying out such plans in fiscal year 1998 and the following five fiscal years. The report shall be in an unclassified form. If there is a classified version of the report, the President shall submit the classified version at the same time.

§ 2354 Termination

After September 30, 1999 , the President— is not required to maintain a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters under section 2351 of this title ; and may terminate the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title . ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1444 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2730 ; Pub. L. 105–261, div. A, title X, § 1069(c)(3) , Oct. 17, 1998 , 112 Stat. 2136 .)

§ 2357 Findings

Congress finds that— United States nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union have achieved important results in ensuring that weapons of mass destruction, weapons-usable material and technology, and weapons-related knowledge remain beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states; although these efforts are in the United States national security interest, the effectiveness of these efforts has suffered from a lack of coordination within and among United States Government agencies; increased spending and investment by the United States private sector on nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, specifically, spending and investment by the United States private sector in job creation initiatives and proposals for unemployed Russian Federation weapons scientists and technicians, are making an important contribution in ensuring that knowledge related to weapons of mass destruction remains beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states; and increased spending and investment by the United States private sector on nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union make advisable the establishment of a coordinating body to ensure that United States public and private efforts are not in conflict, and to ensure that public spending on efforts by the independent states of the former Soviet Union is maximized to ensure efficiency and further United States national security interests. ( Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, § 1332 , Sept. 30, 2002 , 116 Stat. 1448 .)

§ 2357a Definitions

(a) Independent states of the former Soviet Union In this subchapter, the term “independent states of the former Soviet Union” has the meaning given the term in section 5801 of title 22 .

(b) Appropriate committees of Congress In this subchapter, the term “the appropriate committees of Congress” means the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

§ 2357b Establishment of Committee on Nonproliferation Assistance

(a) In general The President shall establish a mechanism to coordinate, with the maximum possible effectiveness and efficiency, the efforts of United States Government departments and agencies engaged in formulating policy and carrying out programs for achieving nonproliferation and threat reduction.

(b) Membership The coordination mechanism established pursuant to subsection (a) shall include— representatives designated by— the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Commerce; the Attorney General; and the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, or the head of a successor department or agency; and such other executive branch officials as the President may select.

(c) Level of representation To the maximum extent possible, each department 1 or agency’s representative designated pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall be an official of that department or agency who has been appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(d) Chair The President shall designate an official to direct the coordination mechanism established pursuant to subsection (a). The official so designated may invite the head of any other department or agency of the United States to designate a representative of that department or agency to participate from time to time in the activities of the Committee.

“SEC. 1311 SHORT TITLE.

“This subtitle may be cited as the ‘Russian Federation Debt for Nonproliferation Act of 2002’.

“SEC. 1312 FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

(“(a) Findings.— Congress finds the following: It is in the vital security interests of the United States to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to additional states or to terrorist organizations, and to ensure that other nations’ obligations to modify their stockpiles of such arms in accordance with treaties, executive agreements, or political commitments are fulfilled. In particular, it is in the vital national security interests of the United States to ensure that— all stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material in the Russian Federation are secure and accounted for; stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material that are excess to military needs in the Russian Federation are monitored and reduced; any chemical or biological weapons, related materials, and facilities in the Russian Federation are destroyed; the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons complex is reduced to a size appropriate to its post-Cold War missions, and its experts in weapons of mass destruction technologies are shifted to gainful and sustainable civilian employment; the Russian Federation’s export control system blocks any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the means of delivering such weapons, and materials, equipment, know-how, or technology that would be used to develop, produce, or deliver such weapons; and these objectives are accomplished with sufficient monitoring and transparency to provide confidence that they have in fact been accomplished and that the funds provided to accomplish these objectives have been spent efficiently and effectively. United States programs should be designed to accomplish these vital objectives in the Russian Federation as rapidly as possible, and the President should develop and present to Congress a plan for doing so. Substantial progress has been made in United States-Russian Federation cooperative programs to achieve these objectives, but much more remains to be done to reduce the urgent risks to United States national security posed by the current state of the Russian Federation’s weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and complexes. The threats posed by inadequate management of weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and complexes in the Russian Federation remain urgent. Incidents in years immediately preceding 2001, which have been cited by the Russia Task Force of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, include— a conspiracy at one of the Russian Federation’s largest nuclear weapons facilities to steal nearly enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb; an attempt by an employee of the Russian Federation’s premier nuclear weapons facility to sell nuclear weapons designs to agents of Iraq and Afghanistan; and the theft of radioactive material from a Russian Federation submarine base. Addressing these threats to United States and world security will ultimately consume billions of dollars, a burden that will have to be shared by the Russian Federation, the United States, and other governments, if these threats are to be neutralized. The creation of new funding streams could accelerate progress in reducing these threats to United States security and help the government of the Russian Federation to fulfill its responsibility for secure management of its weapons stockpiles and complexes as United States assistance phases out. The Russian Federation has a significant foreign debt, a substantial proportion of which it inherited from the Soviet Union. Past debt-for-environment exchanges, in which a portion of a country’s foreign debt is canceled in return for certain environmental commitments or payments by that country, suggest that a debt-for-nonproliferation exchange with the Russian Federation could be designed to provide additional funding for nonproliferation and arms reduction initiatives. Most of the Russian Federation’s official bilateral debt is held by United States allies that are advanced industrial democracies. Since the issues described pose threats to United States allies as well, United States leadership that results in a larger contribution from United States allies to cooperative threat reduction activities will be needed. At the June 2002 meeting of the G–8 countries, agreement was achieved on a G–8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, under which the advanced industrial democracies committed to contribute $20,000,000,000tononproliferationprogramsintheRussianFederationduringa10-yearperiod,witheachcontributingcountryhavingtheoptiontofundsomeorallofitscontributionthroughreductionintheRussianFederation’sofficialdebttothatcountry.TheRussianFederation’sSoviet-eraofficialdebttotheUnitedStatesisestimatedtobe$480,000,000 in Lend-Lease debt and $2,250,000,000 in debt as a result of credits extended under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 [now Food for Peace Act] ( 7 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(“(b) Purposes.— The purposes of this subtitle are— to facilitate the accomplishment of the United States objectives described in the findings set forth in subsection (a) by providing for the use of a portion of the Russian Federation’s foreign debt to fund nonproliferation programs, thus allowing the use of additional resources for these purposes; and to help ensure that the resources made available to the Russian Federation are targeted to the accomplishment of the United States objectives described in the findings set forth in subsection (a).

“SEC. 1313 DEFINITIONS.

“In this subtitle: The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means— the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. The term ‘cost’ has the meaning given that term in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 ( 2 U.S.C. 661a(5) ). The term ‘Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement’ or ‘Agreement’ means the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation entered into under section 1315(a). The term ‘Soviet-era debt’ means debt owed as a result of loans or credits provided by the United States (or any agency of the United States) to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Lend Lease Act of 1941 [former 22 U.S.C. 411 et seq.] or the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act [ 15 U.S.C. 714 et seq.]. The term ‘state sponsor of international terrorism’ means those countries that have been determined by the Secretary of State, for the purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act [ 22 U.S.C. 2780 ], section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [ 22 U.S.C. 2371 ], or [former] section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [former 50 U.S.C. 4605(j) ], to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

“SEC. 1314 AUTHORITY TO REDUCE THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S SOVIET-ERA DEBT OBLIGATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES.

(“(a) Authority To Reduce Debt.— Upon the entry into force of a Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement, the President may reduce amounts of Soviet-era debt owed by the Russian Federation to the United States (or any agency or instrumentality of the United States) that are outstanding as of the last day of the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which appropriations are available for the reduction of debt, in accordance with this subtitle. The authority provided by paragraph (1) shall be available only to the extent that appropriations for the cost (as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 [ 2 U.S.C. 661a(5) ]) of reducing any debt pursuant to such subsection are made in advance. The authority provided by paragraph (1) may be exercised notwithstanding section 620(r) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2370(r) ) or section 321 of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 [ Pub. L. 94–161 , set out as a note under section 2220a of Title 22 , Foreign Relations and Intercourse].

(“(b) Implementation.— The President may delegate any authority conferred upon the President in this subtitle to the Secretary of State. Consistent with this subtitle, the President shall establish the terms and conditions under which loans and credits may be reduced pursuant to subsection (a). In exercising the authority of subsection (a), the President— shall notify— the Department of State, with respect to obligations of the former Soviet Union under the Lend Lease Act of 1941 [former 22 U.S.C. 411 et seq.]; and the Commodity Credit Corporation, with respect to obligations of the former Soviet Union under the Commodity Credit Corporation Act [ 15 U.S.C. 713a et seq.]; shall direct the cancellation of old obligations and the substitution of new obligations consistent with the Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement; and shall direct the appropriate agency to make an adjustment in the relevant accounts to reflect the new debt treatment. All repayments of outstanding loan amounts under subsection (a) that are not designated under a Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement shall be deposited in the United States Government accounts established for repayments of the original obligations. Any reduction of Soviet-era debt pursuant to this subtitle shall not be considered assistance for the purposes of any provision of law limiting assistance to a country.

(“(c) Authorization of Appropriation.— For the cost (as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 [ 2 U.S.C. 661a(5) ]) of modifying any Soviet-era debt obligation pursuant to subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary. Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

“SEC. 1315 RUSSIAN FEDERATION NONPROLIFERATION INVESTMENT AGREEMENT.

(“(a) In General.— The President is authorized to enter into an agreement with the Russian Federation under which an amount equal to the value of the debt reduced pursuant to section 1314 will be used to promote the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons. An agreement entered into under this section may be referred to as the ‘Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement’. The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days in advance of the United States entering into a Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement.

(“(b) Content of the Agreement.— The Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement shall ensure that— an amount equal to the value of the debt reduced pursuant to this subtitle will be made available by the Russian Federation for agreed nonproliferation programs and projects; each program or project funded pursuant to the Agreement will be approved by the President; the administration and oversight of nonproliferation programs and projects will incorporate best practices from established threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance programs; each program or project funded pursuant to the Agreement will be subject to monitoring and audits conducted by or for the United States Government to confirm that agreed funds are expended on agreed projects and meet agreed targets and benchmarks; unobligated funds for investments pursuant to the Agreement will not be diverted to other purposes; funds allocated to programs and projects pursuant to the Agreement will not be subject to any taxation by the Russian Federation; all matters relating to the intellectual property rights and legal liabilities of United States firms in any project will be agreed upon before the expenditure of funds would be authorized for that project; and not less than 75 percent of the funds made available for each nonproliferation program or project under the Agreement will be spent in the Russian Federation.

(“(c) Use of Existing Mechanisms.— It is the sense of Congress that, to the extent practicable, the boards and administrative mechanisms of existing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs should be used in the administration and oversight of programs and projects under the Agreement.

(“(d) Joint Auditing.— It is the sense of Congress that the United States and the Russian Federation should consider commissioning the United States Government Accountability Office and the Russian Chamber of Accounts to conduct joint audits to ensure that the funds saved by the Russian Federation as a result of any debt reduction are used exclusively, efficiently, and effectively to implement agreed programs or projects pursuant to the Agreement.

(“(e) Structure of the Agreement.— It is the sense of Congress that the Agreement should provide for significant penalties— if funds obligated for approved programs or projects are determined to have been misappropriated; and if the President is unable to make the certification required by section 1317(a) for two consecutive years.

“SEC. 1316 INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND THE RULE OF LAW.

“Notwithstanding section 1315 (a)(1) and (b)(1), up to 10 percent of the amount equal to the value of the debt reduced pursuant to this subtitle may be used to promote a vibrant, independent media sector and the rule of law in the Russian Federation through an endowment to support the establishment of a ‘Center for an Independent Press and the Rule of Law’ in the Russian Federation, which shall be directed by a joint United States-Russian Board of Directors in which the majority of members, including the chairman, shall be United States personnel, and which shall be responsible for management of the endowment, its funds, and the Center’s programs.

“SEC. 1317 RESTRICTION ON DEBT REDUCTION AUTHORITY.

(“(a) Proliferation to State Sponsors of Terrorism.— Subject to the provisions of subsection (c), the debt reduction authority provided by section 1314 may not be exercised unless and until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation has made material progress in stemming the flow of sensitive goods, technologies, material, and know-how related to the design, development, and production of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to state sponsors of international terrorism.

(“(b) Annual Determination.— If, in any annual report to Congress submitted pursuant to [former] section 1321, the President cannot certify that the Russian Federation continues to meet the condition required in subsection (a), then, subject to the provisions of subsection (c), the debt reduction authority provided by section 1314 may not be exercised unless and until such certification is made to the appropriate congressional committees.

(“(c) Presidential Waiver.— The President may waive the requirements of subsection (a) or (b) for a fiscal year if the President— determines that application of the subsection for a fiscal year would be counter to the national interest of the United States; and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees.

“SEC. 1318 DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEBT REDUCTION FOR NONPROLIFERATION WITH OTHER CREDITOR STATES.

“It is the sense of Congress that the President and such other appropriate officials as the President may designate should pursue discussions with other creditor states with the objectives of— ensuring that other advanced industrial democracies, especially the largest holders of Soviet-era Russian debt, dedicate significant proportions of their bilateral official debt with the Russian Federation or equivalent amounts of direct assistance to the G–8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, as agreed upon in the Statement by G–8 Leaders on June 27, 2002 ; and reaching agreement, as appropriate, to establish a unified Russian Federation official debt reduction fund to manage and provide financial transparency for the resources provided by creditor states through debt reductions.

“SEC. 1319 IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.

“It is the sense of Congress that implementation of debt-for-nonproliferation programs with the Russian Federation should be overseen by the coordinating mechanism established pursuant to section 1334 of this Act [ 50 U.S.C. 2357b ].

“SEC. 1320 CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS.

“The President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees on a periodic basis to review the implementation of this subtitle and the Russian Federation’s eligibility for debt reduction pursuant to this subtitle.

“[SEC. 1321

Repealed. Pub. L. 112–74, div. I, title VII, § 7034(n) , Dec. 23, 2011 , 125 Stat. 1217 .]”

§ 2357c Purposes and authority

(a) Purposes The primary purpose of the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title should be— to exercise continuing responsibility for coordinating worldwide United States nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts to ensure that they effectively implement United States policy; and to enhance the ability of participating departments and agencies to anticipate growing nonproliferation areas of concern. The coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title should have primary continuing responsibility within the executive branch of the Government for— United States nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts, and particularly such efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and coordinating the implementation of United States policy with respect to such efforts.

(b) Authority In carrying out the responsibilities described in subsection (a), the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title should have, at a minimum, the authority to— establish such subcommittees and working groups as it deems necessary; direct the preparation of analyses on issues and problems relating to coordination within and among United States departments and agencies on nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts; direct the preparation of analyses on issues and problems relating to coordination between the United States public and private sectors on nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts, including coordination between public and private spending on nonproliferation and threat reduction programs and coordination between public spending and private investment in defense conversion activities of the independent states of the former Soviet Union; provide guidance on arrangements that will coordinate, deconflict, and maximize the utility of United States public spending on nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, and particularly such efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union; encourage companies and nongovernmental organizations involved in nonproliferation efforts of the independent states of the former Soviet Union or other countries of concern to voluntarily report these efforts to it; direct the preparation of analyses on issues and problems relating to the coordination between the United States and other countries with respect to nonproliferation efforts, and particularly such efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and consider, and make recommendations to the President with respect to, proposals for such new legislation or regulations relating to United States nonproliferation efforts as may be necessary.

§ 2357d Administrative support

All United States departments and agencies shall provide, to the extent permitted by law, such information and assistance as may be requested by the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title , in carrying out its functions and activities under this subchapter. ( Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, § 1336 , Sept. 30, 2002 , 116 Stat. 1451 .)

§ 2357e Confidentiality of information

Information which has been submitted to or received by the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title in confidence shall not be publicly disclosed, except to the extent required by law, and such information shall be used by it only for the purpose of carrying out the functions set forth in this subchapter. ( Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, § 1337 , Sept. 30, 2002 , 116 Stat. 1451 .)

§ 2357f Statutory construction

Nothing in this subchapter— applies to the data-gathering, regulatory, or enforcement authority of any existing United States department or agency over nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the review of those efforts undertaken by the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title shall not in any way supersede or prejudice any other process provided by law; or applies to any activity that is reportable pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947 [ 50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.]. ( Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, § 1338 , Sept. 30, 2002 , 116 Stat. 1451 .)

§ 2357g Reporting and consultation

(a) Presidential report Not later than 120 days after each inauguration of a President, the President shall submit a report to the Congress on his general and specific nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives and how the efforts of executive branch agencies will be coordinated most effectively, pursuant to section 2357b of this title , to achieve those objectives.

(b) Consultation The President should consult with and brief, from time to time, the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the efficacy of the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title in achieving its stated objectives.

§ 2361 Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State, to the extent authorized by law, should— contract directly with suppliers in independent states of the former Soviet Union when such action would— result in significant savings of the programs referred to in subchapter III; and substantially expedite completion of the programs referred to in subchapter III; and seek means to use innovative contracting approaches to avoid delay and increase the effectiveness of such programs and of the exercise of such authorities. ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1451 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2730 .)

§ 2362 Transfers of allocations among cooperative threat reduction programs

Congress finds that— the various Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are being carried out at different rates in the various countries covered by such programs; and it is necessary to authorize transfers of funding allocations among the various programs in order to maximize the effectiveness of United States efforts under such programs. ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1452 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2730 .)

§ 2363 Sense of Congress concerning assistance to states of former Soviet Union

It is the sense of Congress that— the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other United States programs authorized in title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 ( Public Law 102–484 ; 22 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.) should be expanded by offering assistance under those programs to other independent states of the former Soviet Union in addition to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and the President should offer assistance to additional independent states of the former Soviet Union in each case in which the participation of such states would benefit national security interests of the United States by improving border controls and safeguards over materials and technology associated with weapons of mass destruction. ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1453 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2730 ; Pub. L. 105–261, div. A, title X, § 1069(c)(4) , Oct. 17, 1998 , 112 Stat. 2136 .)

§ 2364 Purchase of low-enriched uranium derived from Russian highly enriched uranium

(a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the allies of the United States and other nations should participate in efforts to ensure that stockpiles of weapons-grade nuclear material are reduced.

(b) Actions by Secretary of State Congress urges the Secretary of State to encourage, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, other countries to purchase low-enriched uranium that is derived from highly enriched uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons.

§ 2365 Sense of Congress concerning purchase, packaging, and transportation of fissile materials at risk of theft

It is the sense of Congress that— the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State should purchase, package, and transport to secure locations weapons-grade nuclear materials from a stockpile of such materials if such officials determine that— there is a significant risk of theft of such materials; and there is no reasonable and economically feasible alternative for securing such materials; and if it is necessary to do so in order to secure the materials, the materials should be imported into the United States, subject to the laws and regulations that are applicable to the importation of such materials into the United States. ( Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1455 , Sept. 23, 1996 , 110 Stat. 2731 .)

§ 2366 Repealed. Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title X, § 1065(c), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1943, and Pub. L. 112–277, title III, § 310(a)(1), Jan. 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2474

§ 2367 Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles

(a) Annual report Not later than January 30 of each year, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the following: The threats posed to the United States and allies of the United States— by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles; and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. The acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 12 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. Any trends with respect to the acquisition described in paragraph (2).

(b) Matters included Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following: Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that possesses weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization. A description of the means by which any foreign country and non-State organization that has achieved, or is making progress toward achieving, capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles has achieved, or is making progress toward achieving, that capability, including a description of the international network of foreign countries and private entities that provide assistance to foreign countries and non-State organizations in achieving that capability. An examination of the doctrines that guide the use of weapons of mass destruction in each foreign country that possesses such weapons. An examination of the existence and implementation of the control mechanisms that exist with respect to nuclear weapons in each foreign country that possesses such weapons. Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that seeks to acquire or develop (indigenously or with foreign assistance) weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization. An assessment of various possible timelines for the achievement by foreign countries and non-State organizations of capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, taking into account the probability of whether foreign countries that are a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime will comply with and enforce the regime, the potential availability of assistance from foreign technical specialists, and the potential for independent sales by foreign private entities without authorization from their national governments. For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target the United States or its territories with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of January 2, 2013 , an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability. For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target members of the Armed Forces of the United States deployed abroad with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of January 2, 2013 , an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability.

(c) Classification Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following: The congressional defense committees. The congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3003 of this title ). The Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate.

§ 2368 Annual reports on the proliferation of missiles and essential components of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons

(a) Report Not later than March 1, 2003 , and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the designated congressional committees an annual report on the transfer by any country of weapons, technology, components, or materials that can be used to deliver, manufacture (including research and experimentation), or weaponize nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons (in this section referred to as “NBC weapons”) to any country other than a country referred to in subsection (d) that is seeking to possess or otherwise acquire such weapons, technology, or materials, or other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to develop, acquire, or deliver NBC weapons.

(b) Matters to be included Each such report shall include— the transfer of all aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery weapons, unguided rockets and multiple rocket systems, and related bombs, shells, warheads and other weaponization technology and materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be intended for the delivery of NBC weapons; international transfers of MTCR equipment or technology to any country that is seeking to acquire such equipment or any other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be used to deliver NBC weapons; and the transfer of technology, test equipment, radioactive materials, feedstocks and cultures, and all other specialized materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to manufacture NBC weapons.

(c) Content of report Each such report shall include the following with respect to preceding 1 calendar year: The status of missile, aircraft, and other NBC weapons delivery and weaponization programs in any such country, including efforts by such country or by any subnational group to acquire MTCR-controlled equipment, NBC-capable aircraft, or any other weapon or major weapon component which may be utilized in the delivery of NBC weapons, whose primary use is the delivery of NBC weapons, or that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to deliver NBC weapons. The status of NBC weapons development, acquisition, manufacture, stockpiling, and deployment programs in any such country, including efforts by such country or by any subnational group to acquire essential test equipment, manufacturing equipment and technology, weaponization equipment and technology, and radioactive material, feedstocks or components of feedstocks, and biological cultures and toxins. A description of assistance provided by any person or government, after September 30, 2002 , to any such country or subnational group in the acquisition or development of— NBC weapons; missile systems, as defined in the MTCR or that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be used to deliver NBC weapons; and aircraft and other delivery systems and weapons that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to deliver NBC weapons. A listing of those persons and countries that continue to provide such equipment or technology described in paragraph (3) to any country or subnational group as of the date of submission of the report, including the extent to which foreign persons and countries were found to have knowingly and materially assisted such programs. A description of the use of, or substantial preparations to use, the equipment of technology described in paragraph (3) by any foreign country or subnational group. A description of the diplomatic measures that the United States, and that other adherents to the MTCR and other arrangements affecting the acquisition and delivery of NBC weapons, have made with respect to activities and private persons and governments suspected of violating the MTCR and such other arrangements. An analysis of the effectiveness of the regulatory and enforcement regimes of the United States and other countries that adhere to the MTCR and other arrangements affecting the acquisition and delivery of NBC weapons in controlling the export of MTCR and other NBC weapons and delivery system equipment or technology. A summary of advisory opinions issued under section 4612(b)(4) of this title and under section 2797b(d) of title 22 . An explanation of United States policy regarding the transfer of MTCR equipment or technology to foreign missile programs, including programs involving launches of space vehicles. A description of each transfer by any person or government during the preceding 12-month period which is subject to sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of Public Law 102–484 ).

(d) Exclusions The countries excluded under subsection (a) are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

(e) Classification of report The Secretary shall make every effort to submit all of the information required by this section in unclassified form. Whenever the Secretary submits any such information in classified form, the Secretary shall submit such classified information in an addendum and shall also submit concurrently a detailed summary, in unclassified form, of that classified information.

(f) Definitions In this section: The term “designated congressional committees” means— the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The terms “missile”, “MTCR”, and “MTCR equipment or technology” have the meanings given those terms in section 2797c of title 22 . The term “person” means any United States or foreign individual, partnership, corporation, or other form of association, or any of its successor entities, parents, or subsidiaries. The term “weaponize” or “weaponization” means to incorporate into, or the incorporation into, usable ordnance or other militarily useful means of delivery.

§ 2369 Repealed. Pub. L. 111–84, div. A, title X, § 1055(f), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2462, as amended by Pub. L. 111–383, div. A, title X, § 1075(d)(13), Jan. 7, 2011, 124 Stat. 4373

§ 2370 Notification of Committees on Armed Services with respect to certain nonproliferation and proliferation activities

(a) Notification with respect to nonproliferation activities The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall keep the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives informed with respect to— any activities undertaken by any such Secretary or the Commission to carry out the purposes and policies of the Secretaries and the Commission with respect to nonproliferation programs; and any other activities undertaken by any such Secretary or the Commission to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or the means of delivery of such weapons.

(b) Notification with respect to proliferation activities in foreign nations The Director of National Intelligence shall keep the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed with respect to any activities of foreign nations that are significant with respect to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or the means of delivery of such weapons. For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “fully and currently informed” means the transmittal of credible information with respect to an activity described in such paragraph not later than 60 days after becoming aware of the activity.

§ 2371 Repealed. Pub. L. 114–113, div. M, title VII, § 701(d), Dec. 18, 2015, 129 Stat. 2930